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1. Introduction 
Why do Norwegians trade more with Germans than Ecuadorians? This is almost a trivial 
question, Germany is closer to Norway, and transportation costs are therefore obviously 
lower. Yet, when we look at the empirical trade data, the situation is less obvious. 
Transportation costs and formal barriers to trade are not substantial enough to exp lain the bias 
in trade towards countries that are situated nearby.  
 There seems to be a ´lack of trade` in the world. This ´missing trade` is a puzzle that 
several scholars have tried to solve. They seek to understand if there is an ´invisible` trade 
barrier that impedes trade over distance. Another issue, closely related to distance, is the 
´border effect`. This is the phenomenon that trade flows are drastically reduced by national 
borders. This report will focus on both effects, and give plausible explanations of these 
phenomena. The reasoning I find most interesting focuses on trust, a psychological sentiment 
usually avoided in the economic trade literature. 
 Why is trust related to economics and trade? In everyday life, trust is a sentiment 
found between friends and family. Yet, economic relations and society in general are 
dependent on trust. Individuals must be confident that money has value. Businesses must 
believe that their banks look after their money. Individuals must be convinced that the 
government will protect their property rights. These – and many other types of trust – are 
prerequisites for a modern society. If individuals never trusted each other, it would be almost 
impossible to enter into an economic transaction. Therefore, trust has everything to do with 
economics.  
 It is hypothesised in this report that the ´lack of trade` is explained by the difficulty of 
finding a trustworthy trading partner in international trade. The global situation is such that 
we have little information about distant business alternatives. This makes conditions for trust 
more cumbersome. However, one can avoid this problem of information and trust by trading 
with the established trade network. Networks are characterised by personal trustworthy 
information, and are predominantly located in a restricted area. This can create an obstacle to 
international trade because businesses prefer to trade with their local networks and do not 
search for other more distant business alternatives. The importance of information and 
communication technology (ICT) is discussed in this context, and I will elaborate on the 
possibility that ICT can reduce the problems in international searching.  
The current process of globalisation, which started in the 1950s, has reduced the costs 
of information (indicated in appendix 1).1 The Internet – in particular – has increased the 
possibility of obtaining less expensive information, and new economic opportunities. This 
phenomenon has created the buzzword ´the new economy`. Yet, empirical studies cla im that 
the world is not so ´new` after all; the elasticity of distance has not changed over the last 20 
years, and therefore seems not to be fundamentally influenced by ICT.  
 To discuss the claimed ´lack of trade` and the influence of ICT, there is a conscious 
bias towards emphasis on trust in the context of transaction costs. Other factors, like historical 
events and consumer preferences, do of course highly influence the patterns of trade. 
However, thorough discussion of such factors has been considered to be outside the scope of 
this report.  
                                                                 
1 ´Globalisation` has been a trendy term ever since the 1980s, but especially from the mid-1990s. In economics, 
globalisation is understood as the integration of economic activity all around the world, particularly through 
trade and financial flows. This integration process is motored by reductions in tariff, transportation and 
communication costs. Yet, it is wrong to believe that ´globalisation` is a new phenomenon. In the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, there was also a period of rapid growth in world trade. Appendix 2 shows that this period 
was also characterised by falling transportation costs (caused by the invention of the internal combustion engine, 
the steamship, and the establishment of many new railroads). 
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 The report is structured as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the concept of trust in 
economics. This is done by looking at how the sentiment of trust is created, and how it 
influences economic transactions and growth. The costs involved in transactions are also an 
important topic in this section, owing to the fact that these costs can reduce trade flows. 
Section 3 starts with a short introduction to international trade theory. These theories are then 
used to explain the foundation of the empirical gravity equation in subsection 3.1. The 
empirical gravity equation is applied in subsection 3.2 to predict less trade over longer 
distances. Subsection 3.3 discusses some possible explanations for the ´missing trade` 
phenomenon. Subsection 3.4 puts special emphasis on the search/network explanation by 
focusing on trust and information. The importance of how modern technology can be used to 
transmit information is discussed in this context. The final subsection 3.5 indicates some 
policy implications of the findings. Section 4 summarises and concludes the report.  
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2. Trust  
Yogis, a Malaysian tourist in Norway, stopped his car in a road juncture somewhere by the 
Norwegian fjords. To his amazement, he finds baskets of ripe cherries for sale, but no one in 
sight. On a cardboard sign, Yogis finds the price and puts his money in a box. He is dazzled 
by the level of trust in this strange country. Why did the cherry owner trust the motorists to 
pay for the cherries? 
Trust is not a new 
concept in economics; it 
was mentioned as an 
important factor by 
Adam Smith and John 
Stuart Mill at the end of 
the 18th and the 
beginning of the 19th 
century. 2 However, 
because of the bilateral 
character of trust and the 
vagueness of the 
concept, empirical 
investigations were not 
common before the 
1990s.3  
Trust between individuals can be defined as one agent’s sentiments of expectations 
towards another agent’s positive behaviour with respect to oneself, in a situation involving 
risk.4 Hence, the cherry owner is confident about Yogis’ behaviour, even if there is a risk that 
he will drive away putting no money in the box. Why are these expectations present? 
The source of trust most frequently found in economics is the ´rational explanation`, 
presupposing that individuals are inclined to trust each other due to pay-offs in the long run.5 
This explanation is based on neoclassical thinking. 6 Trust is a bilateral concept, and can be 
depicted in a game.7 We consider a common public goods game, as depicted in table 1, where 
two individuals, denoted A and B, are represented in the game. It is supposed they know they 
will only interact once.8 What would be the outcome of this game? The most commonly used 
solution framework is the Nash equilibrium, characterised by any situation where all the 
participants in a game are pursuing their best possible strategy given the strategies of all the 
                                                                 
2 Citations on trust by these authors, and others, can be found in Zak and Knack (2001). 
3 The interest in trustworthiness as a measurable concept was stimulated in part by Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama 
(1995), but with antecedents in, for example, Coleman (1990). 
4 This definition is based on Boon and Holmes (1991). 
5 See Krame r and Tyler (1996) for further discussion on trust as a rational concept. 
6 The term ´neoclassical thinking` is a crude and imprecise way to classify a group of different economists. 
Complete agreement has not been reached on what is meant by neoclassical economics. However, some 
generalisations can be justified. The theories generated from the marginal revolution proclaim that value is not 
only created from the supply side (as in classical thinking) but also from a relationship between demand and 
supply. This relationship is based on individuals who maximise their utility, and companies maximising their 
profits. These behavioural assumptions are normally used by neoclassical theoreticians in combination with the 
assumption that people act rationally on the basis of relevant information. 
7 ´A game is any situation in which there are participants, rules of conduct and pay-offs` (Bannock, Baxter and 
Davis 1998, p.290). 
8 This is called an ultimatum game. 
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other participants.9 All players’ expectations are fulfilled, and all players’ strategies are 
optimal.  In this scenario, the only stable solution is that both diverge from co-operation.10 
Why do they not co-operate? The problem is that when A decides to co-operate (giving 3 
units), the rational response by B is to diverge (given the higher profit, 5 units). If B chooses 
to co-operate (giving 3 units), A will diverge (giving the higher profit, 5 units). 
 
Table 1: Common public goods game 11 
A\B Co-operation Divergence 
Co-operation 3, 3 -3, 5 
Divergence 5, -3 -1, -1 
 
Yet, in real life we can frequently observe co-operation taking place and people exposing 
themselves to risk without exploitation. Neighbours construct playgrounds for their children, 
couples get married (sometimes ending up in exploitation), and the cherry owner got money 
from Yogis. The rational model of trust explains this phenomenon by expanding the game 
depicted above to an infinitive time perspective. The agents A and B are impatient and 
discount the future by the factor d  1,0Î . Both individuals act under the same strategy: 
Choose co-operation in period t if both have co-operated in every period before period t. 
Choose divergence in every period in the future if the agents have breached the agreement 
earlier.12 Under these assumptions, divergence by one of the agents, say A, will lead to the 
profit ...5 32 ---- ddd The profit will be large in the first period, but because of the 
strategy there will be no co-operation thereafter, and consequently the pay-off is –1 in the 
following periods. However, if A co-operates, the profit will be equal ...3333 32 ++++ ddd . 
Breaking an agreement will only be profitable in this case if 3
1<d  (this result is calculated 
in appendix 3). Hence, co-operation is a stable equilibrium in this situation given that d  is 
large, which indicates that individuals can co-operate in the long run, due to the higher profit 
under collaboration. 
The ´rational explanation` coincides with the definition of trust, because the two 
rational agents will have optimistic expectations about one another in a situation involving 
risk, owing to the possibility of earning higher profits in the future. Nevertheless, I find the 
rational model quite questionable. Firstly, the Nash assumptions seem unlikely, given the fact 
that individuals seldom know all possible outcomes of a transaction. Secondly, the concept of 
trust can go beyond the certitude that two individuals will co-operate because it is beneficial 
for both in the long run. However, I mention the rational model in this report because it may 
well contain some truth. The interesting part of the explanation is the notion of frequent 
interactions. A positive experience of trustworthy behaviour can initiate expectations of future 
trustworthy behaviour. Frequent interaction can also create a learning process where more 
confidence is created during the process. However, someone still has to start the interaction, 
making a ´leap of confidence` that can be risky and costly. So, either the interaction starts 
                                                                 
9 The Nash equilibrium is not sufficiently limited to be universally interesting as a tool of analysis. More refined 
concepts of equilibrium have been created. However, the Nash equilibrium remains the foundation for most 
discussions in game theory. 
10 This solution is frequently called ´prisoner’s dilemma` in game theory. 
11 The table is from Torsvik (2000). 
12 This strategy is an example of a trigger strategy; which is characterised by co-operation until the point where 
someone fails to co-operate. This triggers a switch to non-cooperation forever after. The trigger strategy can 
sometimes be observed in the setting of a monopoly price. See Gibbons (1992) for further information about 
game theory. 
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without trust, and the initial ´step` is very small, with a low degree of risk, or else trust may 
have another origin.  
Why did the cherry owner trust Yogis to pay when he most probably never would 
return? Maybe the fruit owner looks at all motorists as a group and has prior positive dealings 
with them, and therefore trusts the motorists. However, an experiment by Engle-Warnick and 
Slonim (2001) showed that individuals may trust each other at the beginning of the game with 
no knowledge about each other. This does not coincide with the ´rational explanation`. 
Consequently, there may be other reasons why economic agents have the ability to trust. 
Adam Smith (1759) wrote in his ´The theory of Moral Sentiments`: 
 
´How selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes 
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he 
derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Our 
imagination therefore attaches the idea of shame to all violations 
of faith`.13  
 
Maybe the cherry owner trusted the motorists because he knew they would feel shame and 
guilt if they stole the cherries.14 These sentiments could exist because individuals have norms 
that can trigger sentiments when they are violated. In their book ´Trust in organizations` 
(1996), Kramer and Tyler discuss the subject ´social contextualism`: individuals act in their 
social contexts, not necessarily in their self- interest. The social model of trust considers trust 
as a public good with a value of its own, and hence explains trust in terms of moral bonds, 
social obligations and identity formation. The motive behind trust in the social model can also 
be described in a game theory scheme15, which explains the interaction between two altruistic 
agents. An altruistic person will increase his own welfare by the benefit of the other agent. 
This is controlled for by the parameter a , between 0 and 1, connected to the opposing agents’ 
income. This creates the situation depicted below: 
 
Table 2: Altruism 
A\B Co-operation Divergence 
Co-operation aa 33,33 ++  aa 35,53 -+-  
Divergence aa 53,35 +--  aa 11,11 ----  
 
Co-operation is the equilibrium if 31³a , hence if the parameter for the importance of the 
other individuals’ pay-off is more or equal to 1/3. If A and B co-operate, A will get 
4
3
1
33 =÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ+ . If A diverges she gets 4
3
1
35 =÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ- . The first alternative is strictly better when 
31>a . Altruism can therefore give basis for trust and co-operation depending on the degree 
of self-sacrifice. The social type of trust can often be created in religious, ethnic or family 
groups, where it is assumed that one individual’s welfare will be augmented by increasing the  
profits of the other individuals. Individuals are not necessary ´greater human beings` by acting 
out of a social definition of trust, considering that the social context can also be a selfish 
strategy.  
 
                                                                 
13 Cited in Bowles and Gintis (2001) p.2. 
14 Such sentiments are of importance in the article by Gintis (2000), Bowles and Gintis (2001), Gintis, Bowles, 
Boyd and Fehr (2002). 
15 Figure from Torsvik, G. (2000), p. 22. 
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Therefore, we can roughly say there are two main perspectives on trust, the rational model 
and the social model. However, the sources of trust should not be separated completely, and it 
is important to draw knowledge from both definitions. Individuals can, for example, initiate 
interaction due to trust created by the feeling of similarity. However, through dealings with 
each other a rational type of trust may develop. Consequently, reasons for trust can be 
somewhat entwined. Instead of looking at the figure 1, choosing one or the other, we can 
change the view and use a distinction by Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) as depicted in table 3. 
They identify three levels of trust: micro, meso and macro. 16 
 These distinctions are not contradictions of the definitions already mentioned, but are 
supplements. Micro- level trust is driven by the agent’s confidence in the reputation and 
capacity of the subjects being trusted, as the rational model depicted above. Meso- level of 
trust is based on individuals having confidence because they belong to the same social, 
religious or ethnic group. The meso level is related to stereotypes, and can be inaccurate. 
Macro- level trust relates to an agent’s belief in laws and formal institutions. Agents are 
                                                                 
16 The table is based on Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) and Murphy (2002). 
Trust
Rational model
of trust
Social model
of trust
Figure 1: Definitions of trust
 
  Macro - level Trust  
·  Driven by a belief in formal institutions or goodwill .  
·  Higher risk, more generalised .  
·  Emerges through higher order beliefs .  
  
Meso - level Trust  
·  Based on ascriptions – race, religion, kinship, etc.  
·  Relatively superficial , less risky than macro - level trust .  
·  Based on experiences , history, and cultural influences .  
·  Useful when quick decisions must be made .  
Micro - level Trust  
·  Developed through shared experiences .  
·  Relatively  labour-intensive to create .  
·  Emerges through  observed competence ,  is lower risk .  
  
Higher order trust  
Lower order trust  
Table 3: Levels of trust 
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motivated to trust by a general belief in the goodness of human kind, or a belief in the 
institutions guaranteeing the accountability of other individuals (such as the court system). 
Both the meso level and the macro level contain elements of the social model of trust. 
The separation from low order trust to high order trust17 shapes a better and more flexible 
distinction between the concepts. Levels can overlap, depending on the individual and the 
situation in question. The concepts discussed in this section will be fundamental for further 
analysis.    
 
Can trust be created? 
This question has already been answered to some extent. However, to understand the full 
complexity of trust some more origins should be discussed. The micro level and macro level 
of trust can be influenced by factors so as to promote trust. However, the meso level, where 
group membership is important, is somewhat difficult to influence. We will look at some 
factors that determine trust, and judge if man can shape these factors. 
1. Predictability 
a) Reputation/history of interaction/information: A history of past interactions or 
information about the other party’s behaviour can create trust and reputation 
effects. Frequent interactions can be institutionalised through a middleman. This 
intermediary can create a ´bridge of trust`, since they have much more frequent 
and multiple dealings with sellers and buyers. Without the middleman, the 
transactions between the merchants would be scarce, and the potential for the 
reciprocal type of trust would be lower. Consequently, a middleman can be a 
mediator between traders that do not trus t each other, but who trust the 
middleman. 18 It is possible to observe this phenomenon in the Namibian tourist 
industry. In this country, new technology has made it possible for local tourist 
dealers to promote their products over the Internet to consumers in far-away 
places. However, observations confirm that consumers prefer to organise their 
trips through established domestic travel agencies (that function as facilitators) 
rather than through cheaper local alternatives. This might be the case due to 
credible guarantees given by international travel agencies, or because these 
companies have established some kind of reputation that makes them 
trustworthy. 19 Reputation is also a factor that can be created through the 
establishment of a brand name that shows consistent quality over a long period of 
time. Reputation does not have to be connected only to a brand, but can also be 
connected to a company or a whole sector. A good reputation is created from a 
long history of trustworthy behaviour if it is the level of trust one is perceived to 
merit.   
b) Similarity/identity/moral bonds: Similarity can bring about trust due to the 
assumption that it is difficult to act opportunistically towards someone equal to 
oneself. This similarity can be manifested through equal religion, race, social 
belonging or a subjective sentiment of perceived equality. 20 Resemblance based on 
ethnicity has been an issue in many empirical studies on trust.21 Several studies 
confirm the hypothesis that equal ethnic background increases trust; however, this 
                                                                 
17 Similar definitions are given by Sako (1992), who distinguishes contractual, competence and goodwill trust. 
The latter category would resemble the macro-level trust defined in the text. Aubert and Kelsey (2000) also use 
similar definitions in their research. 
18 More about middlemen can be found in Landa (1994), Spulber (1999). 
19 Wiig (2002) has an ongoing project on the Namibian tourist industry. 
20 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) for more information on similarity as a determinant for trust. Perceived 
similarity is elaborated in Walczuch and Seelen (2000). 
21 See La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997) for such studies. 
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depends somewhat on the specifications of the variables. Cheating is perceived to 
be more prevalent across cultures, and trust between communities is often low. 22 
The same religion can create equal identity, and give assurance that certain 
values/norms will be complied with, promoting trust. However, these factors of 
similarity, representing the meso type of trust, are not easily created. Ethnicity and 
religion are normally not easily changed, even if there are a few examples of this.23  
Yet, identity and norms may well be manipulated. The education system is a 
channel for the creation of moral values. A type of macro- level trust can be created 
if the school system emphasises honesty and trustworthiness. An example of the 
contrary is the school system in Ecuador, where anecdotal evidence shows that 
several schools practises a high degree of corruption. Payments for grades, and 
´gifts` delivered from parents when their children misbehave, are part of everyday 
life. These schools did not promote honest behaviour. A strong state might also 
create a sentiment of group identity and social conscience. However, it is doubtful 
that the state alone can create such a conscience, since other factors as history are 
important. A history of trusting business norms may establish a ´culture of trust` in 
the culture pattern. Norms in society may, hence, be self-reinforced. Sako (1998) 
claims that Japan is an example of such a development. Country- specific 
institutions and history give rise to unique levels of trust in each country.  
2. Controllability 
c) Contract/sanctions: These factors are to some extent determinants in a trusting 
relation. A contract can for example be an institution that establishes a framework 
to promote trust in a relation. This framework consists of rules that generate 
control and transparency, giving a trusting sentiment of having the same goals. 
Micro- level trust can also be created in contracts through a step-by-step 
philosophy. Since one party has to make the first ´leap of confidence`, a system is 
created where the first step is very small, with low risk. If no problems are 
observed, the next and bigger step can be taken by the other side, and so on. This 
strategy can establish micro- level trust in a long-term contract. This starting 
problem can also be observed in networks, where brokers and facilitators are used 
to kick-start networks. The starting problems are caused by the fact that networks 
are based on trusting co-operation. 24 Sanctions can also create an institution that 
can foster co-operation and to some extent trust. This could be observed during the 
Middle Ages in the long-distance trade around the Mediterranean. A network of 
Maghribian traders worked together, punishing individuals that swindled any 
participant in the network. The sanction mechanism was a widespread diffusion of 
information about the stained reputation and an understanding never to trade with 
this person again. This mechanism also functioned within the network, creating 
trust due to the threat of ostracism.25 
 
 
                                                                 
22 Fafchamps (1999) also mention that trust is low between cultures. 
23 During precolonial times, some Kenyan traders converted to Islam to do business with the Arab traders. When 
it comes to ethnicity, one should not forget that it is a somewhat floating concept. In some places, group 
belonging can change only by changing the garment. In the Andean Mountains individuals belonging to the 
Indian ethnic group can change their ethnicity to mestizo just by putting on western clothes. The borders 
between groups conflicts can change according to the social preferences of the time and different emphasis on 
history, as it does in the history of Burundi, where the identity of the Hutus and Tutsis has gone from equal to 
differentiated  (Eriksen 1998).  
24 See Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) for more information on ´kick-start`. 
25 For more information on the Mediterranean traders see Greif (1993) and Greif (2000). 
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3. Interdependence 
d) Altruism26: The confidence that the other party has interest in the well-being of 
oneself can create trust. This socially based trust is often used to explain trust in 
family relations. The state can also create this altruism through nationalistic 
propaganda, so the citizens might find the well-being of other inhabitants in the 
same country to be part of their own welfare. Similar to altruism is the notion of 
having the same goals; this sentiment can create trust in a contracting situation 
where much focus has been placed on emphasising equal goals (see e.g. in textbox 
1). 
e) Asymmetry: If there is asymmetry in a relationship there is a possibility to create 
co-operation in the face of risk. Two individuals may know that the other will act 
in a trustworthy manner because one party has power over the other. However, this 
is not necessarily trust; it might be the sentiment of fright that leads to co-
operation, not trust. 
We can sum up the different factors that influence trust in table 4: 
 
Table 4: Determining factors for trust relationships 27 
a) Reputation/history of interaction/information Predictability 
b) Similarity/identity/moral bonds 
Controllability c) Contract/sanctions 
d) Altruism Interdependency 
e) Asymmetry 
2.1. Trust and transaction cost economics 
According to Arrow (1972, p. 357), ´virtually every commercial transaction has within itself 
an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be 
plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by 
the lack of mutual confidence.` This is perhaps an exaggerated statement, but it conveys a 
clear invitation to further exploration of trust as a concept in economics. The nature of trust as 
a bilateral concept can best be understood economically in a transaction cost framework. This 
framework will be presented in the following chapter to create a deeper understanding of trust 
from an economic perspective. 
2.1.1. Transaction cost economics – an overview 
The neoclassical theory is the dominant theory for explaining economic behaviour, allocation 
of resources and growth. This theory was established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, and shaped the logic of trade models used today. This theoretical perspective makes 
strong assumptions about the success of a perfect market in allocating resources efficiently. 
One of these assumptions is that there are no costs involved in transactions. Coase (1937) 
disagreed with this perspective, claiming that transaction costs are the main reason why firms 
are created.  He pointed out that different costs arise in market transactions when the price 
mechanism is used to allocate resources. He indicated that these costs could be avoided if the 
command system of a firm conducted these transactions. Coase (1937) was the first to make 
this important connection between institutions, transaction costs and neoclassical theory. 
However, many have followed up his research, the most prominent being Oliver E. 
                                                                 
26 Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr (2002) experiment on human behaviour in the contexts of altruism in their 
article ´Explaining Altruistic Behaviour in Humans`. They find that individuals have ´strong reciprocity`. 
27 Inspired by table 1, in Usunier and Roger (1999). 
  10 
Williamson, who dominated the creation of the ´transaction cost economics` perspective.28 
Neoclassical economics and transaction cost economics are to some extent complementary, 
but there are some distinctions. A few of these differences are reviewed here, so as to grasp 
better how transaction cost economics part from the most dominant theoretical perspective 
today. 29 
Individuals: Firstly, neoclassical theory assumes agents to be completely rational; they 
have full information and know all possible outcomes of a transaction. Furthermore, the 
theory assumes that a third party can enforce contracts between economic agents without cost.  
This enables us to create complete contracts without unpleasant surprises. Contracts can even 
be unnecessary. In contrast, in a transaction cost perspective incomplete information and 
limited capacity to process this information makes it costly to identify all the possible 
outcomes. Individual behaviour is described as boundedly rational,30 something Williamson 
(1998) defines as a behaviour intended to be rational but only limitedly so. The behavioural 
assumption of bounded rationality fosters incomplete contracts, which do not discuss all 
outcomes, and may give unpleasant contractual disagreements.  
 Secondly, transaction cost theory presupposes economic agents to be opportunistic. This 
characteristic signifies that individuals will act out of self- interest even if this makes them 
unfaithful to their contracting party. Consequently, if the agreement cannot be enforced by an 
external institution (courts, the state, the clergy), individuals will act in their most beneficial 
manner, but that does not necessarily create co-operation. However, the theory does not 
assume that individuals are identically or continuously opportunistic.31  
The firm: In transaction cost theory one can view the company as a governance structure, 
or as Bjuggren (1985) describes it, a ´nexus of contracts`. This is a different perspective from 
that described in the neoclassical textbooks, where firms are understood as production 
functions with inputs and outputs. This latter perspective views the firm as a technological 
construction, while transaction cost theory sees the concept in an institutional framework. 
The market: The neoclassical market is a market where there is full information, and no 
asymmetries or trading costs. The market is a locality where demand and supply meet, with 
no frictions whatsoever. However, this does not fit with reality. Transaction cost economics 
incorporates the fact that a large amount of resources in the world is used on transfers, and 
that institutions are important determinants of the efficiency of the markets.32 A market where 
exchange is costly is the view of transaction cost economics. Bjuggren (1985) classifies three 
categories of costs involved in transactions in his book ´A transaction cost approach to 
vertical integration`: 
a) Search costs33 are the costs required to match a buyer and a seller, so that they can decide 
to negotiate. Such costs can involve finding information about potential business partners 
and examining the quality of the products. This type of transaction cost will be important 
to understanding why we find less trade over longer distances. 
                                                                 
28 For a thorough introduction to transaction cost economics, read Williamson (1998), Spulber (1999), and North 
(1990). 
29 One should be careful to emphasise too much on economic ´schools` (as the neoclassical), due to the 
crudeness of such generalisations. However, in this context it is done to create a clear distinction, so as to grasp 
the concepts better. 
30 Simon (1957) first developed this concept. 
31 More about opportunism can be found in Klos and Nooteboom (2001), Spulber (1999), North (1990), 
Williamson (1998), Hart and Holmström (1987). 
32 North (1990) discusses further the costs involved in transactions. 
33 Search costs have been incorporated into matching models of e.g. labour markets, but also outsourcing. (e.g. 
Grossman and Helpman (2002)) 
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b) Negotiation costs refer to the resources used to reach an agreement on essential questions 
such as price, payment, quantity and delivery terms. In other words, they represent the 
costs of concluding a contract. Meeting hours and legal fees are examples of such costs. 
c) Control costs are the costs involved in monitoring the agreement, settling smaller disputes, 
inspecting to ensure satisfactory quality, and making sure that payments and goods are 
delivered on time. This is necessary in order to prevent the other party from breaching the 
agreement. 
These cost distinctions give insight concerning the nature of a transaction. There exist 
different stages, which encompass different requirements. This understanding of the 
longitudinal character of the exchange will be important in the discussion of trust in 
transactions. Trust may have varying influence during a transaction and different types of 
trust can play different roles. 
Contracts : If we call neoclassical theory the ´science of choice`, a natural description of 
transaction cost theory is the ´science of contracts`.34 Contracts are consequently the building 
stones of the theory, creating the framework for discussion. We mentioned earlier that 
contracts are unavoidably incomplete, because of the assumption that individuals have 
bounded rationality. This incompleteness makes contracts risky, something that will be 
discussed in the following section.  
The two theories seek to answer different questions and view the economy from different 
angles. Trust, being the concept of interest in this report, is better understood in the 
transaction costs perspective since trust can influence the cost of transactions. Since the 
neoclassical theory does not incorporate transaction costs or other market imperfections, it is 
likely to be less useful in a discussion of trust in an economic perspective. Nonetheless, 
transaction cost economics did not initially incorporate trust as a factor to examine at all. The 
theory was developed due to the desire to understand the creation of firms. The following 
section offers some insight into the main topics of transaction cost economics (TCE) and the 
questions the theory seeks to answer. These concepts will be applied in a further analysis to 
understand the influence of distance on trade flows. 
2.1.2. Main TCE topics 
One issue that has received extra attention in the TCE literature is the costs created by 
specialisation. For instance, when a plastics producer delivering cups enters into a contract 
with a plate purchaser, the plastic company has to invest in new machinery and maybe even 
employ a new engineer to handle the new process of making plates. Transaction cost 
economists emphasise that when a business partner makes investments specifically adapted to 
the transaction process, they are more dependent on the collaborator. For this reason, the 
plastics producer is dependent on the plate purchaser. If the plastic producer acts 
opportunistically, he is left with equipment he cannot use or that is expensive to dispose of. 
This asset specificity increases risk because it makes the producer more vulnerable to 
opportunism. Williamson (1981) distinguishes between three different types of asset 
specificity:35  
a) Site specificity: where location-specific investments are made. 
b) Physical asset specificity: where machinery or other capital goods are modified 
in a specific manner. 
c) Human asset specificity: where educational or other human investments are 
made for a specific purpose.   
                                                                 
34 Terms used by Williamson (1998). 
35 Asset specificity is also elaborated thoroughly by Bjuggren (1985), Klos and Nooteboom (2001), Spulber 
(1999). 
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Therefore, if a firm in a contracting situation changes its physical production process, hires 
new employees, or builds a construction on a new site adapted to the other firm, it can find 
itself facing a ´hold-up` problem. This problem can be summarised in figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: The hold-up propblem36 
 
 
 
The economic agents A and B are trading partners. However, in order to trade, A has to make 
a relation-specific investment, which involves a cost. This cost can occur in the explicit 
transaction process as classified by Bjuggren (1985). The plastics producer may have used 
considerable resources to find an appropriate purchaser (search costs). The negotiations with 
the plate purchaser may have taken time in assuring capabilities (negotiation costs). Finally, 
the producer needs to monitor that payments are made in time and that the agreement in 
general is being maintained (control costs). However, the cost involved in the ´hold-up` 
problem can go somewhat beyond Bjuggrens’ definition. It is a cost connected not only to the 
transaction process, but also to the physical investments created by the contract. If A and B 
co-operate, they gain equal amounts: 30 dollars to A and 30 dollars to B. But if B reneges on 
the original agreement, he will earn a larger profit of 50 dollars for himself and agent A will 
lose 10 dollars. If no trade is conducted, there will be zero profits for both trading partners. To 
make any trade take place in this situation, there have to exist commitments between the 
economic agents.37 Trust is one type of commitment that can make A and B co-operate. If A 
has confidence that B will not act opportunistically, there will be no risk in the transaction and 
trade will be beneficial for both.  
 
Figure 3: Vertical integration38   
                                                                 
36 This figure can also be found in Torsvik (2000). 
37 See Torsvik (2000) for more information about the ´hold-up` problem 
38 This illustration is based on the text of Williamson (1998). 
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The vulnerability of transactions due to asset specificity is seen by transaction cost 
economists as the main reason why firms decide to handle the whole production process by 
themselves. This is in the literature called vertical integration. The concept of vertical 
integration refers to the process of internalising costs normally found between businesses, 
giving common ownership of the whole process. Consequently, an interesting perspective in 
the field of transaction cost economics is the firms’ decision to ´make-or-buy`. What is most 
advantageous, buying articles from the market or making the products oneself? As illustrated 
by figure 3, a firm can be described by an integrated core technology with a possibility of 
downstream integration (backwards) into the production of inputs. Upstream integration 
(forwards) into distribution is another alternative. Some larger companies have integrated the 
whole process from inputs to advertisement and distribution. 39 The vertical integration 
decision gives the foundation for a comparative study in alternative institutions of 
governance. This is a fundamental tool for transaction cost economics and can be illustrated 
by a ´simple contracting scheme`, as depicted in figure 4. Given the level of asset specificity, 
uncertainty and transaction costs, it is possible, by a comparative view, to observe what 
constitute adequate institutional arrangements. 
As shown in figure 4, there exist ´hybrid` models between the poles of market (A) and 
hierarchy (D).40 The k in the ´simple contracting scheme` denotes the degree of asset 
specificity. If the asset is for general purpose (k=0), then transaction costs will be minimised 
through flexible purchases in the market (as long as the market is competitive). Consequently, 
the firms’ best choice will be the market solution (A). Nevertheless, if the asset is investment 
specific (k>0), and there are no safeguards (s=0), we have a hybrid solution with hazard (B). 
However, if investments are made in safeguards (s>0) to the contract, there may be created a 
hybrid solution, such as a joint venture or a licensing regime (C). One type of safeguard 
against opportunism is trust, and this can create such a hybrid solution, which will be 
elaborated in the following section. Finally, it is possible to take total control of the process 
                                                                 
39 Look up Williamson (1998) and Bjuggren (1985) for more information on vertical integration. 
40 Figure from Williamson (1998) p. 38. 
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by full vertical integration and creation of firm (D). The predictions are based on the degree of 
asset specificity and the willingness to expose oneself to risks.41  
Transaction cost economics is a theory focusing on how we can predict the shape of 
institutions from transactions and costs.42 In this section, I have tried to give some insight into 
the central topics of TCE, but there are several themes that are not mentioned. The important 
element for further analysis is the notion that there are costs involved in transactions. This is 
important because it opens up the possibility for a cost-reducing factor, namely trust. 
2.1.3. Trust in Transactions  
What happens if one does not trust the trading partner? The most extreme consequence is that 
many exchanges (that would benefit both parties) will not materialise, which can lead to 
efficiency losses. If risk is involved in a transaction, agents may choose spot trade instead of 
more binding and profitable solutions. Mistrust can thus be looked upon as a market 
imperfection problem. 43 Some transactions entail a higher degree of risk, especially when 
goods and services are exchanged for future payments, or employees perform a task that is 
difficult to monitor. Differentiated goods are frequently associated with a higher degree of 
asset specificity and risk due to the uniqueness of the products.44 Nevertheless, trade can take 
place under imperfect conditions because safeguards can be made against opportunism. If one 
or more of the factors now following are fulfilled, trade can materialise between trading 
partners even if there is a risk of opportunism.  
                                                                 
41 For more information about the ´make -or-buy` dilemma, look up Shelanski and Klein (1999), Woolthuis, 
Hillebrand, and Nooteboom (2002), Bjuggren (1985), Spulber (1999), Williamson (1998). 
42Hodgson and Knudsen (2000) argue that the TCE scope fails to consider the learning effect inside firms. This 
firm-specific learning can give firms an advantage even if there are low costs in the market. A further discussion 
of such topics is outside the scope of this report.  
43 See Landa (1994) on trust as a market imperfection problem. 
Textbox 1: ”Partnering agreement”  
In 1995, the Norwegian Road Department in Oslo started a new concept called ´partnering 
agreement`, when contracting an entrepreneur. They have started 9 different contracts, and 
8 have been completed since the beginning. The agreement is an addition to the classical 
legally binding contract, and is based on free will. A partnering contract tries to unify the 
goals of the Department and the entrepreneur, creating relationships at all different levels 
of the organizations. The ´partnering` document that is written in co-operation with the 
entrepreneur is not a contract, but a symbol of commitment. ´Having fun` is specified in the 
agreement, and this tells something about its contents. The experience gained by the Road 
Department has been solely positive. Conflicts were solved more easily and at a lower 
hierarchical level (because people knew which level to contact). They trusted and 
understood each other and saved time created by misunderstandings. The estimated 
economic gain by this agreement was 600 000 NOK per contract (Interview with Svein 
Røed, Norwegian Road Administration in Oslo, head of the ´Bjørvika project`, and Flaate  
(1994)). In this example from the Road Department we find a combination between different 
levels of trust. The Department tries to create macro-level trust through emphasis on the 
equal goals between the two institutions. In addition, informal social gatherings connect the 
employees, making it possible to create micro-level trust (rationally based). 
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1. Complete contracts, with a third party to monitor and punish divergence from the 
agreement. 
2. Trust between the trading partners because they calculate a long-term profit by co-
operating (´rational model of trust`). 
3. Trust between the trading partners because the economic agents have each other’s 
interests under consideration due to moral obligation, altruism or social status (´social 
model of trust`). 
 
There is a tendency to consider these conditions as substitutes. When there is trust there is 
therefore no need to make a formal contract. Or, with a complete contract, there is no need to 
trust. This might be right in some cases, but Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom (2002) 
have conducted a longitudinal case study following four different cases combining high/low 
trust and high/low formal control. The study confirms many predictions put forward by 
transaction cost economics, but there existed a case of high trust and a high degree of formal 
control. This does not support the idea of substitution. However, contracts can also serve other 
functions. A contract can make safeguards against risk from the external environment, such as 
the bankruptcy of a partner, accidents and other similar external incidents. A contract can also 
function as a technical aid to manage the relationship, keeping track of the meeting schedule, 
problem-solving techniques, etc. Furthermore, contracts can be a sign of commitment, giving 
a signal to trust (see textbox 1).45 Consequently, one has to conduct studies of transactions 
over time to observe whether trust exists before the contract is made or whether it is a 
consequence of a contract. The study carried out by Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom 
(2002) indicates that trust and formal control can function as both substitutes and 
complements. However, they also argue that if a relationship starts with a formal contract, and 
the relationship is characterised by high asymmetric dependence, it is difficult to create 
(macro- level) trust due to the atmosphere of suspicion. Consequently, when looking at the 
preconditions for possible trade one or more of the three factors should be considered, not 
taking for granted that they are substitutes. 
 Complete contracts are difficult and expensive to create owing to the assumption that 
individuals act opportunistically. Making the contract as complete as possible will require a 
transparent, consistent and legitimate court system, and functioning laws. Costs may well 
increase due to high lawyer’s fees, and time will be consumed when negotiating a contract as 
perfect as possible.46 Yet, the other two safeguards mentioned, rational and social trust, can 
create co-operation, and at the same time reduce costs. There are different ways that trust can 
reduce transaction costs: 
1. Search costs will to some extent be influenced by trust. When screening to find a 
potential business partner, confidence in capacity and trustworthiness is of utmost 
importance. A time-consuming search process can hence be drastically shortened if a 
company has a network of trusting relationships. These networks can contain business 
opportunities or give trustworthy references about other companies. These 
recommendations can substitute the need for costly personal experience with every 
potential business partner. A good reputation created through a brand name can also 
bring about sufficient trust to interact without personal experience. Furthermore, 
societies with a high level of macro- level trust will generate lower search risk because 
there is a general assurance that other companies will act trustworthy. Macro- level 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
44 Rauch (1999) discusses transactions involving differentiated goods.  
45 Partnering agreements as discussed in textbox 1 are also the theme in Lorenz’s (1999) article. He studied 
´moral contracts` in France. 
46 Tyler and Kramer (1996) discuss the costs needed to prevent opportunism. 
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trust is a general notion emerging from a higher order belief in human behaviour. 
Search costs will be essential in the discussion about trade and distance. 
2. Negotiation costs will be reduced by trust due to the decreased need for detailed 
specifications about quality, price, delivery time and penalty set-ups. Less time is 
needed to specify formalities, due to the confidence about the other party’s honesty 
and capabilities. 
3. Control costs that involve monitoring the quality and sustainability of the contract in 
the long run are most definitely reduced by a higher level of trust. This is in particular 
the case when there are asset-specific investments that make one part more dependent, 
or when quality is very difficult to monitor. Siamwalla (1983) researched the 
structures in Thailand’s markets and found great differences in the trade patterns 
between rice and rubber. Rice is a product where quality is easily observed at the 
moment of purchase. This made it easier to buy from any salesman and make an 
efficient impersonal market. The quality of raw rubber is not possible to determine 
when bought. Only after further elaboration of the raw material will the true quality of 
the rubber materialise. This makes it very important to establish a trust relationship 
with the seller so as to be guaranteed a quality product. Hence, trust at any level can 
function as an informal control mechanism, which enhances the efficiency of 
transactions. 
 
Consequently, we can conclude that trust reduces transaction costs. Yet, to create micro-level 
trust, investments need to be made.47 This earned type of trust can only exist if there has been 
an initial ´leap of confidence`.  Maybe a gift without obligations is needed, or a small project 
to test the other company. This first step involves a risk, maybe not great, but some costs are 
involved. Therefore, it is imperative to look at the net benefit of trust in transactions.48 
Transaction cost economics does not originally define trust as a type of safeguard. 
Williamson (1993) argues that trust in the rational sense adds nothing to analysis, and that if a 
wider definition were used, trust would be a blind concept. He writes that blind trust will not 
survive in competition. However, other authors argue that trust is a real concept and will not 
be blind because there are limits to trustworthiness. In a trusting relationship, one is not 
permanently on alert regarding opportunities and risks of opportunism. However, when 
conditions arise that exceed the perceived limits to temptations of opportunism, or when 
unexpected behaviour is observed, attention to the hazards of opportunism is triggered and 
shifted from subsidiary to focal awareness.49 Consequently, trust will not be blind, as 
Williamson claims (1993). It will be restricted.  
Before we move on to trade transactions over borders, and the importance of trust in this 
context, I think it is important to understand that trust might play an important role in 
development, working as a factor through growth. This connection is vital for grasping the 
importance of trust in the world economy. 
2.1.4. Trust and economic performance 
In the debate on developing countries, the question of trust has received increased attention. 
In 1996, the World Bank set up a group to study the relevance of social capital, of which trust 
is a central component. Trust is emerging as the new ´missing factor` that explains why some 
countries or regions develop more rapidly. Thus, what are the mechanisms concealed behind 
                                                                 
47 Mookherjee (1999) gives an example from the Indian software industry, where they find empirical 
significance that there is a steep cost in building up reputational capital for new firms. 
48 Sako (1998) also mention the costs of creating trust. 
49 These arguments are also elaborated in Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom (2002), Klos and Nooteboom 
(2001). 
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the assumption that countries will develop faster due to trust?  This is not obvious, and several 
tentative explanations are given. A great problem is causality, which to some extent can seem 
circular. I will try to clarify some of the arguments, and indicate an answer to causality. In the 
following section I will focus on developing countries to see how these countries are 
influenced by trust. 
Firstly, we can observe the situation of the  micro level of trust. In these interpersonal 
relations there is assumed to be a potential learning process beneficial for innovation. 50 If trust 
is present, new ideas and helpful comments will more easily be volunteered in a relationship. 
This information flow can stimulate new concepts and create growth in society. Another 
channel to growth through trust is assumed to be through the reduction of transaction costs. 
This has been mentioned in earlier sections, and is one of the main explanations behind 
growth through trust. Individuals who co-operate without conflict or opportunistic behaviour 
create the basis for a well functioning and growing economy. 51 Trust can be essential to 
creating any economic interaction at all. Highly trusting societies use fewer resources on 
enforcement of contracts and property rights, hence liberating resources to innovation and 
growth. 
Secondly, the other common explanation is on a higher trust level. Governments are 
assumed to perform better and more efficiently if they are trusted by the people in their 
country. In addition, high-trust societies have presumably more confidence in politicians and 
their economic policy, creating a better allocation of resources.52 Consequently, macro- level 
trust in a country’s institutions creates better institutions and improves government policies. 
Macro- level trust per se is considered by some authors to be the essential component for 
development. Hence, the predisposition to co-operate due to a general morality or a higher 
order belief creates a population endowed with social capital in the same sense as labour or 
capital.53 
Empirical studies have been conducted on the connection between trust and growth.54  
However, all these studies measure micro-level interpersonal trust, aggregating this to a 
societal level. As we have explored in this report, the concept of trust has several levels and it 
is not obvious that such an aggregation creates the right results. Yet, a possible explanation 
legitimating an aggregation is the connection through networks. Micro- and meso- level trust 
can be the basis for networks creating economically efficient transactions within themselves. 
If this network is closed and based on strong family ties the economic effect is not necessarily 
positive in relation to growth. However, if the network is open for new contact through 
referral, it can be an important factor in creating organisations and better economic activity.  
This connection between interpersonal micro- level trust and aggregate economic activity can 
legitimate an investigation at the micro level. Knack and Keefer (1997) develop such an 
investigation, using the World Values Surveys data from thousands of respondents in 29 
market economies. Their observations come from two different periods. 21 countries are 
represented in the 1981 survey and 28 countries are represented in the 1990 and 1991 surveys.  
                                                                 
50 For further discussion of the learning process, see Sako (1998).  
51 Trust as a central factor to creating co-operation is emphasised by Fukuyama (1995) and Coleman (1988). 
52 Putnam (1993) emphasises that trust can better the character of political participation. 
53 Information about social capital can be found in Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2000). 
54 Putnam (1993), La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and 
Knak (2001) have conducted empirical studies on trust and performance. 
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Table 5: Trust in different countries 
Country Trust Confidence in government Ethnic homogeneity 
1. Norway 61.2 0.72 98 
2. Finland 57.2 0.66 90 
3. Sweden 57.1 0.65 88 
4. Denmark 56.0 0.76 95 
5. Canada 49.6 0.70 70 
6. Australia 38.27 0.64 98 
7. Netherlands 46.2 0.63 99 
8. US 45.4 0.61 81 
9. UK 44.4 0.54 82 
10. Switzerland 43.2 … 72 
11. Iceland 41.6 0.73 100 
12. Japan 40.8 0.46 99 
13. Ireland 40.2 0.73 94 
14. Korea, South 38.0 0.61 100 
15. Spain 34.5 0.55 75 
16. India 34.3 0.67 72 
17. Austria 31.8 0.60 99 
18. South Africa 30.5 0.70 73 
19. Belgium 30.2 0.60 57 
20. Germany 29.8 0.54 99 
21. Argentina 27.0 0.28 91 
22. Italy 26.3 0.44 99 
23. France 24.8 0.62 94 
24. Nigeria 22.9 0.73 32 
25. Chile 22.7 0.64 78 
26. Portugal 21.4 0.45 99 
27. Mexico 17.7 0.53 58 
28. Turkey 10.0 0.61 82 
29. Brazil 6.7 0.55 88 
 
The question asked in the survey to measure the level of trust is: ´Generally speaking, would 
you say most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?` 
Trust is measured as the percentage of respondents in each country that reply ´most people 
can be trusted`. Their results can be found in table 5.  
Knack and Keefer (1997) find correlation between trust and growth, stating that ´the 
coefficient for trust (…) indicates that a ten percentage point in that variable is associated with 
an increase in growth of four-fifths of a percentage point` (Knack and Keefer, 1997, p.1260). 
Nevertheless, when checking for robustness in this analysis, Beugelsdijk, Groot and Schaik 
(2002) find that a 10% point increase in trust has an effect on growth ranging between 0.4% 
points and 0.8% points, depending on the set of conditioning variables. According to this 
analysis, the impact of trust on growth evinced by Knack and Keefer is not evident. Yet, Zak 
and Knack (2001) use a bigger data set, and find significant correlation between trust and 
growth. More empirical studies should be conducted to verify this hypothesis; however, the 
studies already conducted substantiate this connection between trust and growth. It is difficult 
to know if it is really trust that is being measured and not some other variable influencing 
growth. And if trust is being measured, what comes first? Could it also be probable that richer 
countries have better institutions that stimulate an environment of trust? Knack and Keefer 
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(1997) find the causality by observing that trust correlates more with the 1990 growth data 
than the 1970 growth data, implying that trust comes before higher income. Consequently, 
there seems to be a correlation between trust and better economic performance.55  
2.1.5. Trust and developing countries 
Weak economic activity, poverty, fragile infrastructure and a low education level characterise 
developing countries. The governments in several developing countries are influenced by a 
high degree of corruption and nepotism. The capital market is in many countries unstable and 
income inequality is extensive. However, it is important to emphasise that the term 
developing countries (if defined as low- and middle-income countries) is a group of 90 
countries. These countries are not equal geographically, resource-wise or population-wise, so 
when generalisations are made they should be interpreted with some caution. Tables 6 and 7 
indicate some of the characteristics low-income countries experience compared to the high-
income groups: 
 
Table 6: Some characteristics of developing countries56 
ECONOMY POPULATION 
MILLIONS 
IN 2000 
GROSS 
NATIONAL 
INCOME 
$ BILLION = 2000 
GNI PER CAPITA  
$ = 2000 
World 6,057 31,315 5,170 
Low-income 2,460 997 410 
Middle- income 2,695 5,319 1,970 
High- income 903 24,994 27,680 
 
 
Table 7: World education data57 
Net enrolment ratio 
% of relevant age group 
 Primary Secondary 
 1980 1997  1980 1997 
World 81 90  60 68 
Low-income 66 76  38 51 
Middle- income 86 97  63 71 
High income 97 100  87 96 
 
The empirical research presented in table 5 indicates that low-income countries have a lower 
level of micro-level trust. However, there are only 29 countries represented in the table, a 
number not sufficiently large to say something accurate about the general world situation. 
Yet, there is an observable tendency towards lower levels of trust in poor countries. To 
understand this phenomenon I think it is important to focus on poverty. When two individuals 
who are very different at the level of material goods interact, it is hard to imagine equal 
motives behind an interaction. If one person has strong needs because of poverty, the 
temptation to forsake an agreement to obtain a benefit in the short run may be greater. If both 
                                                                 
55 Linders, Groot and Nijkamp (2002) give an interesting overview of the literature involving trust and growth. 
56 The table is based on data from World Bank Development Report (2002). The different income groups are 
ranked from 206 countries. Low-income economies are those with a GDP per capita of $765 or less in 1995, 
middle-income, $766-$9,385, high-income, $9,386 or more. 
57 Table based on data from World Bank Development Report (2000/2001), p.285. The income groups are 
defined in the same way as in table 6. 
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individuals are poor, this temptation might be present for both agents. Table 8 (1) is a 
reminder of the ´prisoner’s dilemma` situation, creating a scenario with non-co-operation. 
However, as mentioned before, if we expand this situation to an infinitive time perspective the 
existence of rationally based trust can be explained. Following the line of reasoning from this 
argument, it is plausible that a poor individual has a lower discount factor, d , because he is 
more impatient.  
 
Table 8 (1): Common public goods game 
A\B Co-operation Divergence 
Co-operation 3, 3 -3, 5 
Divergence 5, -3 -1, -1 
 
Poor people have lower life expectancy than rich individuals, due to worse nutrition 
conditions. This will give fewer periods to discount for, and hence a lower discount factor. 
Also, the marginal utility of income tends to be reduced when individuals increase their 
income. Consequently, a poor person increasing his income by, for example, $1 will get a 
higher increase in utility than a rich person from the same dollar. The long run benefits of 
being honest and trustworthy can be so far in the future that the poor person will be tempted 
to act dishonestly. It may be easier to trust someone that is well off.58 However, this is not 
always the case. There are poor and trustworthy people. This is no surprise since trust not 
only originates from the rational definition but can originate from moral obligations, identity 
formation, sanctions etc. Yet, poverty should not be forgotten as a factor influencing trust. 
Meso-level trust, based on identity formation, can have better conditions in developing 
countries. Many studies indicate that networks in developing countries are based on strong 
family and kinship ties. It is striking that business success stories from developing countries 
are characterised by family-controlled conglomerates or close-knit ethnic networks. These 
networks do not always create economic prosperity, owing to their closed character.59 
Nepotism and rent-seeking can dominate them, creating ineffective solutions for society in 
general. A reason why this family-based trust is important in developing countries may 
originate in malfunctioning formal institutions. Due to an ineffective legal system, corruption 
and delays, contracts are more expensive to enforce.60 Murphy (2002) studies the influence of 
innovation and trust among small and large-scale manufacturing firms in Mwanza, Tanzania. 
He finds that open networks are more restrained by rent-seeking corrupt officials than closed 
networks. We will discuss the importance of open and closed networks in section 3.4.3.  
Governments are also seldom strong enough in developing countries to build the national 
identity necessary to create altruism towards an extended group.61 Family and ethnic 
belonging are often more prevalent as identity creators, substituting for these institutions. 
Trust seems less abundant in poor countries due to poverty, fragile institutions, ethnic 
heterogeneity and lower levels of education. However, more important for understanding the 
question posed in the introduction – why we find less trade over distance – is looking at the 
level of trust towards developing countries. Traders from rich countries may find the 
institutions in developing countries so unstable that they do not trust that their interests will be 
protected. An inefficient bureaucracy and malfunctioning infrastructure can create delays in 
delivery, making wholesalers from developed countries more distrustful towards their trading 
                                                                 
58 Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find income to be one of the main determinants of trust; however, this 
investigation is not from a developing country but from the US. 
59 Fafchamps and Minten (2000) emphasise that family networks are not necessarily productive in ´Returns to 
Social Network Capital among Traders`. Murphy (2002) also mentions this phenomenon in Tanzania. 
60 This is discussed in Mookherjee (1999). 
61 This is not always the case; president Nkrumah in Ghana was early in establishing a Ghanaian identity. 
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partners. Consumers in developed countries may show scepticism towards certain products 
delivered from developing countries. This can especially be observed in the market for 
ecologically produced food. The consumers of these types of products prefer to shop locally 
when this is possible. If the demanded product is off-season, products from neighbouring 
countries are preferred. However, products from far-away locations are met with distrust. It is 
important to separate different types of product. Standardised products have a fixed market 
price and quality is easily observed. These products are not so much influenced by trust. 
However, for differentiated products, where quality can be variable and prices are negotiated, 
trust becomes a factor of greater importance. Since developing countries are to a large extent 
producers of standardised goods (see appendix 4), trust may seem less important for these 
countries’ products. However, recent developments in the global commodity chains show that 
supermarkets are increasing control of the production process. Wholesalers in developed 
countries are demanding certain standards of packing, quality, variety, processing, labour 
conditions and price. A carrot may seem like a standardised product, but today one can find 
carrot batons, mini-carrots in tray, mini-crunch carrots, peeled and sliced carrots or basic 
carrots with or without a bag. Consequently, there is an increasing degree of diversification of 
products from developing countries. Producers in these countries need to establish that they 
are able to adapt reliably to the demanding requirements set by the major customers.62 
2.1.6. Summary 
This first section has focused on the concept of trust and transaction cost economics. Trust has 
been claimed to originate from two main sources, the rational and the social. Trust is 
furthermore separated into three different levels (micro, meso and macro) to obtain a finer 
distinction of the concept.  All these definitions were applied to analysing trust in the context 
of economic interaction and growth, and will be used in the following sections. Transaction 
cost economics was introduced in relation to neoclassical theory to create a framework for 
analysing trust in economics. Key concepts in transaction cost economics were explored, like 
asset specificity and opportunism. These concepts gave insight into a discussion on how trust 
can function as a safeguard against opportunism and reduce transaction costs. We started this 
report with the question: is distance dead? This is not yet answered; however, knowledge 
about trust will create a background to understanding the further discussion of distance and 
trade. 
 
                                                                 
62 More information about commodity chains can be found in Dolan and Humphrey (2000). 
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3. International trade 
Transactions across country borders are especially exposed to transaction costs. Many have 
tried to explain international trade and the observed trade patterns. Trade models have existed 
since the pre-classical theories of the Mercantilists (16th and 17th centuries). However, it is the 
classical theories that created the roots of today’s thinking. This tradition started with Adam 
Smith (1776) and his writings on absolute advantages, inspiring David Ricardo, who in 1816 
presented his famous argument on comparative advantage. The theory predicts that a country 
can have an advantage in the production of some product relative to another country. This has 
influenced trade theory ever since. Especially the neoclassical theorists have developed their 
models on this principle; one example is the Heckscher-Ohlin model, focusing on factor 
differences as the basis for trade. The post-neoclassical theories of trade that have dominated 
more recent research are moving away from the perfect competition of the neoclassical world. 
These theories incorporate monopolistic behaviour, differentiation of products and economies 
of scale to explain intra- industry trade.63  
 The trade theorist Gene Grossman (1999) proclaimed that something is fundamentally 
wrong with the trade models. He is convinced that a more realistic trade model is necessary to 
incorporate common policy, language and culture, making increasing distance an important 
factor. This surge for increased realism might be based on the fact that the best established 
empirical regularity in trade, the gravity equation, predicts that less trade will occur over 
longer distances.64 Consequently, the orthodox trade models can be claimed to be 
fundamentally wrong when they cannot predict the trade patterns that have been common 
knowledge for many years. However, since Anderson (1979), it has been increasingly 
recognised that the gravity equation can be derived from several established trade models, 
giving theoretical underpinning. Perhaps Grossman’s criticism is not valid, maybe the trade 
models are realistic. Yet although common language, culture and policy are still not 
customary readings in economic textbooks on trade, I find them essential and interesting 
factors. I will come back to such factors at the end of this section, but first some further 
introduction to the gravity equation. 
3.1. The gravity equation  
In the 17th century the mathematician Sir Isaac Newton defined the laws of motion and 
gravitation using calculus. From these laws, he estimated that the attraction between objects 
(planets) is proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to their respective distance.65 
The theory of gravity that explains the forces between planets was first applied in social 
science by Carey in 1858 to explain the sociological phenomenon of group behaviour. Today, 
the gravity model is used in many different fields of study: transportation, physical planning, 
environmental studies, regional economics and geographical analysis. In geography, the 
model has become the most common framework in geographer’s spatial interaction analysis. 
However, economists, starting with Beckerman (1956), have also applied this method, using 
the model to study intra-European trade. In this early period no theoretical foundation was 
discovered.66 
                                                                 
63 See Grimwade (2000), Norman (2001) and Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (1998) for general 
information on trade theories. 
64 Nevertheless, distance is important when models use ´iceberg costs`. This is quite common in ´new geography 
models`. Some ´new theories of trade` use transportation costs to determine the location of firms, see Markusen 
and Venables (1998) 
65 Adams (1991), for further information on Sir Isaac Newton, and the laws of motion. 
66 See Gitlesen and Jörnsten (2000), Ubøe (2001), Leamer and Storper (2001) for further overview. 
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Figure 5:The gravity equation 
3.1.1. The framework 
The essence of the spatial interaction model is simple: it is a function that emphasises the 
attributes of location and the friction of distance between the two. Figure 5 illustrates the 
principles of the gravity model, 67 where there are two basic impacts:68 
1. Scale impact: Countries with large economies tend to attract more economic activity than 
small countries. Large economies have numerous businesses that can create more 
connections with each other. Search is facilitated by more business opportunities. Hence, 
trade flows between x-y will be greater than x-z. 
2. Distance impact: The greater the separation between places, people or activities, the less 
likely they are to interact. Therefore, trade flows between x-q will be greater than x-y 
even if they are equally large in economic size. 
 
To summarise the facts, we can multiply the scale of each country, the GDPs, by each other. 
The gravity model measures bilateral trade flows; consequently, we look at two countries at 
the same time, designated by the subscript i and j. Interaction between any pair of countries is 
specified as ijExports . The interaction can be expressed as a ratio of the multiplied GDPs 
over the kilometres (DISTij) measured between any pair of countries. 
  
(1)
( )
( )b
a
ij
ji
ij
DIST
GDPGDP
Exports =  
 
(2) ( ) ijjiij DISTGDPInGDPInExports lnba -=  (log- linear form) 
 
The parameter a is the elasticity of exports with respect to GDP. The variable b  represents 
frictions in relation to distance, a parameter that will be discussed later in this report. 
                                                                 
67 The gravity figure is inspired by Gatrell (1983). 
68 The impacts of scale and distance are also stated in Haynes and Fotheringham (1984). 
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3.1.2. Trade models and the gravity equation 
Anderson (1979) was the first to recognise the connection between trade models and the 
empirical gravity equation. He created a theoretical foundation that has been developed in 
different directions by several authors up to the present time.69 Although different 
perspectives are discussed, they all agree that product specialisation is a crucial determinant in 
explaining the gravity model. I have chosen to base my explanation on a model by Deardorff 
(1995), since he focuses on both scale and distance impacts of the gravity equation. Deardorff 
uses a Heckscher-Ohlin model with certain assumptions to explain product differentiation and 
the deduction of the gravity equation. Firstly, an important assumption is that each good is 
only exported and produced by one country, giving the same implications as the Armington 
Assumption. 70  
  Secondly, the Heckscher-Ohlin model used by Deardorff (1995) has trade in both 
goods and factors. The inclusion of factor trade normally creates a situation of equalised 
factor prices.71 However, given positive transportation costs, the factor prices do not need to 
be the same (that is the case in this model). The transportation costs are assumed to be of the 
´iceberg` type. This implies that a fraction (tij-1) of the goods shipped from i is used in 
transport to country j.72 The exporting country will not discriminate between markets, and 
country i will receive a single price, pi, for its products in all markets. The importer’s price 
will be tijpi, because the buyers pay the transport cost.  
 Finally, to say anything about the patterns of bilateral trade, it is necessary to specify 
preferences. Preferences are assumed to be identical in both countries. Deardorff (1995) uses 
Cobb-Douglas preferences in his model, creating a situation where consumers in both country 
i and j spend a fixed share, iq , of their income on the product of country i. The output of 
country i is denoted xi, while country i’s nominal73 income is iY . Then, 
 
(3) å === j Wijiiii YYxpY qq  
 
The world income is denoted WY . Equation (3) can be rewritten as Wii YY=q . If 
transportation costs are not included, we obtain the simple frictionless gravity equation, where 
ijT  represents the nominal value of exports from country i to j : 
 
(4)
W
ji
jiij Y
YY
YT == q  
 
                                                                 
69 Helpman and Krugman (1985), Bergstrand (1990), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), Evenett and Keller 
(1998), Deardorff (1995) and Deardorff (2001) are examples of authors that all discuss the theoretical foundation 
for the gravity equation. 
70 This assumption proclaim that consumers view goods as differentiated by country of origin, as in Anderson 
(1979) Markusen and Wigle (1990), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Baier and Bergstrand (1999). The 
Armington assumption is commonly used to explain product differentiation in models of imperfect competition, 
as the post-neoclassical models. However, in the example by Deardorff (1995) goods are really different. 
71 Especially when there is perfect competition and zero transportation costs. 
72 Formally, there is a part of the traded product that does not reach the destination. It ´melts away` on the 
journey. Paul Samuelson (1954) was the first to describe transportation costs in this way, making it unnecessary 
to model ´transportation` as a good in itself. This way of modelling transportation costs has been especially 
prevalent in ´new trade theory` models and ´new geography models`. Krugman (1998) elaborates further on 
´iceberg costs`.  
73 All nominal values are denominated in the same currency unit (e.g. US $). 
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However, when transportation costs are present, the trade flows have to be reduced 
proportionally. The nominal value of exports is then: 
 
(5)
W
ij
ji
ij Yt
YY
T =  
 
Equation (5) is similar to the gravity equation represented in equation (1). However, the 
equation by Deardorff (1995) implements transportation costs instead of the variable called 
distance in equation (1). The alpha, representing the elasticity of exports with respect to GDP 
in equation (1), is not present in equation (5). This is due the assumption that preferences are 
Cobb-Douglas. The friction variable, beta, is also not mentioned due to the assumption of 
´iceberg costs` to explain distance. It is possible to obtain a more realistic model by 
incorporating CES preferences, instead of Cobb-Douglas preferences. This makes bilateral 
expenditure on international trade decline with distance, creating the friction variable as 
represented in (1). Other authors, such as Evenett and Keller (1998), argue that a combination 
between Heckscher-Ohlin theory and increasing returns of scale models, are the best adapted 
to explaining observed trade flows. I will not discuss which model is the best to account for 
the gravity equation, but rather emphasise that classical, 74 neoclassical, 75 and post-
neoclassical models 76 can all predict product specialisation and therefore all explain the 
gravity equation (under certain assumptions). Consequently, the gravity equation cannot be 
used to test trade models (as has been tried before), because it can be deduced from several 
models. 
3.2. Distance and border effects 
In the gravity model, we apply distance in a physical sense, measuring the quantity of 
kilometres in a straight line between capitals of countries and using it as a proxy for 
transportation costs. McCallum (1995) studied trade flows between 10 Canadian provinces 
and 30 US states for 1988. To investigate this matter he used the gravity equation. Equation 
(6) represents the regression he obtained, in a log linear form: 
 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) borderdyyx ijjiij 09.3log42.1log06.1log21.1log +-+=  
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.13) 
 
Standard errors are the numbers reported under the coefficient estimates. The rest of the 
parameters are similar to the parameters in equation (2). However, equation (6) has a specific 
variable to represent adjacent borders. The distance variable –1.42 equals a situation where 
two regions separated by 500 miles trade 2.67 times as much as two regions separated by 
1000 miles, everything else being the same.77 Nevertheless, an even more striking result is the 
importance of the border, called the ´border effect` or ´home bias effect` in the literature.78 
McCallum (1995) find that trade between two provinces is more than 20 times larger than 
                                                                 
74 The Ricardian model (technology differences) can predict full specialisation. 
75 Versions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model (where factor proportions are very different). Bergstrand (1990) and 
Deardorff (1995) focus on these models. 
76 Evnett and Keller (1998) focus on increasing returns to scale models, Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) 
emphasise monopolistic competition models. 
77 This estimate is calculated by making the distance variable (1.42) the exponent to relative distance between the 
regions (1000/500), hence ( ) 67,242,1
500
1000
= . 
78 The ´border effect` is defined as less trade conducted over country borders than within the country border. 
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trade between a province and a similar sized state, each pair having the same distance. Since 
minimal tariffs existed between the US and Canada at the time of the research, some 
important unobserved transaction costs seem present in international trade.79 
 Furthermore, another interesting empirical study by Frankel, Stein and Wei  (1997) 
estimates the gravity equation over major countries between 1970-90, with dummies for 
language in common, regional grouping and common border.80 Their research produced the 
estimates in table 9: 
 
Table 9: Gravity Estimates of Trade, 1970-1990  - Frankel, Stein and Wei  (1997) 
 Dependent variable: log (Trade) 
Intercept -9.70* -9.78* 
 (0.27) (0.27) 
1980 dummy -1.01* -1.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
1990 dummy -1.29* 1.37* 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
GNP product 0.72* 0.73* 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Per capita GNP product 0.23* 0.23* 
Distance -0.51* -0.51* 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Adjacency 0.72* 0.72* 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Common language 0.47* 0.47* 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
EC bloc 0.31* 0.24* 
 (0.06) (0.09) 
East Asia bloc 2.12* 2.26* 
 (0.09) (0.18) 
Western hemisphere bloc 0.31* -0.32* 
 (0.08) (0.10) 
EC*trend  0.006 
  (0.006) 
East Asia*trend  -0.013 
  (0.012) 
Western Hemisphere*trend  0.063* 
  (0.009) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Trend=Year-1970.  
* Denotes significance at 1% level. R2 =0.72 
 
This study does not come out with the same importance of distance as in McCallum’s (1995) 
research. However, countries at 500 miles apart conducted 1.42 times as much trade as 
countries at 1000 miles apart.81 The reason why the estimate is so different from McCallum 
(1995) may originate from the use of dummies in Frankel, Stein and Wei (1997), absorbing 
some of the earlier effect measured by distance. This may, for example, be the language 
                                                                 
79 Wei (1996) studied the OECD countries in the same way as McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1996) and 
confirms the home bias present also in these countries. 
80 They also use year dummies and an interactive time trend with regional dummies. 
81 This is calculated in the same way as earlier: ( ) 42,151,0
500
1000
= . 
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variable that increases trade by 60 %,82 the adjacent country variable, doubling trade,83 and 
the regional bias variables, increasing trade.84  
 The last investigation I will refer to is a study conducted by Crafts and Venables 
(2001). Table 10 summarises their results on trade flows, together with other gravity studies 
on different topics. Crafts and Venables (2001) claim that the elasticity of trade flows with 
respect to distance is normally estimated at between –0.9 and –1.5. The first column in table 
10 shows the results of their estimation, expressing trade volumes at different distances 
relative to their value at 1000 km (with an elasticity of –1.25). When distance is 4000 km, 
trade flows are down to 0.18. This is a total fall of 82% from the trade at 1000 km. At 8000 
km trade flows have sunk to 0.07. This is a 93% downward fall from initial trade.85 The other 
columns show similar estimates by Portes and Rey (1999) on cross-border equity transactions, 
Di Mario (2000) on FDI, and Keller (2000) on technology flows.  
 
Table 10: Economic interactions and distance  86 
 Trade Equity flows FDI Technology 
1000km 1 1 1 1 
2000km 0.42 0.55 0.75 0.65 
4000km 0.18 0.31 0.56 0.28 
8000km 0.07 0.17 0.42 0.05 
 
Consequently, the studies confirm that trade flows are influenced by borders and dis tance. 
The two phenomena are displayed as separate effects in the investigations referred to in this 
section. Yet, there may well be similar underlying causes of these phenomena. This will be 
discussed further in section 3.3, but first, we need to see if these effects can be explained by 
the most frequently applied reasoning, transportation costs.  
3.2.1. Transportation costs 
The most logical and obvious explanation of why there is less trade over distance is the 
transportation costs needed to move goods between locations. Yet, Hummels (1999) estimates 
that average freight costs of US imports in 1994 were only 2.8% of import value. These rates 
do not vary considerably over different products and it is not a large enough cost to be an 
important consideration for most long-distance trade. Furthermore, table 11 illustrates how 
ocean shipping costs have been reduced over the last two hundred years.87 This table and 
appendix 2 indicate that if the distance effect is created by transportation costs, then the 
significance of distance should be reduced over time. However, this is not the case. Rose 
(1999) has made estimates of the distance elasticity showing that over the last 20 years, the 
impact of distance has remained unchanged and not significantly affected by communication 
and transportation improvements. Moreover, Grossman (1998) comments that the distance 
                                                                 
82 (1.6=exp(0,47)) 
83 (2.05=exp(0.72)). This dummy was presented as a parameter in McCallum (1995). 
84 EC trade increases 36% (1.36=exp (0.31)); Western Hemisphere trade increases 36% and East Asia bloc 
increases trade 733% (exp (2.12)=8.33). 
85 These calculations are conducted in relation to 1000, being the point of departure. When the elasticity of 
distance is –1.25, we find the result using: ( ) 25,11000
Dist
Factor= . This will yield different results over increasing 
distance: ( ) ( ) ( ) .07,025,1
8000
1000
,18,0
25,1
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1000
,42,0
25,1
2000
1000
===  
86 Table from Crafts and Venables  (2001), p.8. 
87 Shipping costs are just one of the factors involved in global transportation, but they represent an example of 
the continuing communication revolution in the world. 
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and border effect observed by McCallum (1995) is far too large to be explained by 
transportation costs or formal barriers to trade. This implies that there are other explanations 
of the ´distance effect`.  
 
Table 11: Real Costs of Ocean Shipping 88 
Years between 1750-1990 Real Shipping Costs (1910=100) 
1750 298 
1790 376 
1830 287 
1870 196 
1910 100 
1930 107 
1960 47 
1990 51 
 
Several studies, more than have been referred to in this report, confirm that distance and 
border effects reduce trade flows. These studies are most frequently based on the gravity 
equation. However, Trefler (1995) wrote an article called ´The case of the Missing Trade and 
Other Mysteries`, using the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek framework.89 He concluded that trade 
between developed countries is far too large compared to their factor endowments. Countries 
in the North should trade more with the countries in the South, given the objective differences 
in factor endowments. Hence, there is a ´lack of trade` compared to what can be expected 
from the factor endowment models and compared to what can be explained by transportation 
costs.   
Deardorff (1995) modelled transportation costs as a proxy for distance. This is a common 
way to understand the distance variable (DISTij) found in equation (1). Yet, when 
transportation costs are not sufficiently high to explain the ´distance effect`, we should 
explore other dimensions of the concept of distance. 
3.2.2. Distance as a multidimensional concept 
The geographer Gatrell (1983) classified distance in four categories (apart from mere 
kilometres), where transportation costs only represent one category:  
1. Time distance: The travel time from one node to the other. 
2. Economic distance: The costs of travelling from one node to the other. 
3. Cognitive distance: Distance people feel subjectively. 
4. Social distance: Distance in social classes and networks. 
 
The cognitive distance is a dimension I find especially interesting. It is defined as the space an 
individual feels subjectively between two nodes. Downs and Stea (1977) create a clearer 
distinction between ´perceived` and ´cognitive` distance. Perceived distance is the observed 
physical space between two nodes. The cognitive distance is the subjective feeling of this 
same space. This feeling of distance can occur because of cultural, language, ethnic, 
institutional or historical differences. In Norway, one can observe a much larger trade flow 
towards Denmark and Germany than towards Finland and Russia. The fact that the two latter 
countries share physical borders with Norway does not hinder the cognitive sentiments that 
these countries are further away than Denmark and Germany (where there is no land border). 
                                                                 
88 Table from Crafts and Venables  (2001), p.6.  
89 He identifies the theoretical prediction of factor-proportion models of international trade, put forward by Eli 
Heckscher (1991), Bertil Ohlin (1991) and Jaroslav Vanek (1968). 
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This feeling of distance may have its origin from the lack of cultural, linguistic and historical 
bonds towards Finland and Russia, in comparison to Denmark and Germany. Furthermore, the 
´time distance` may also be a factor for some types of products. Norway can hardly be 
challenged by Chile on the European fresh fish market, due to the time consumed to transport 
fish from Chile to Europe. However, in the frozen fish market, where time is less important, 
we may expect Chilean fish to become very competitive. Looking at distance as a 
multidimensional concept can be fruitful, and may contribute to an explanation of the 
´mystery of the missing trade`. With this thought in mind, I start to explore different 
explanations of the ´mystery`. 
3.3. Some plausible explanations 
Parsley and Wei (1999) titled an article ´Border, Border, Wide and Far, How We Wonder 
What You Are`,90 giving a humorous twist to the lack of definitive answers to the ´border 
effect`. Tentative answers are offered: the influence of equal currencies,91 differing 
institutions,92 and preferences for goods from the home market.93 James Rauch has developed 
an explanation that focuses on trust, networks and information asymmetries. I find this 
argument convincing and interesting and I want to elaborate further on his view.   
3.3.1. Consumer preferences 
Why do French drink wine and Germans beer? These stereotypes illustrate the point that 
individuals grow up in a culture with certain habits and traditions. Such traditions may 
originate from local access to products, yet Spain has for centuries imported dried fish from 
Norway to produce the traditional Bacalao. So, if not always the case, taste and availability 
can influence the local market. Can this be the origin of the ´border effect`? That each 
country’s citizens have certain preferences constructed by local access to products and 
resources? Or that consumers want to support local industry to maintain activity in the home 
region? Such patterns have been observed in the ecological food industry. Denmark is an 
example of a country where consumers prefer to buy local products when they are shopping 
for ecological food, and they are sceptical about imports. Do consumers have distrust towards 
foreign products in general? Today it is mandatory to label every product with its country of 
origin. Several studies have been conducted to understand consumer behaviour in relation to 
such labelling. One study conducted by Arne Wiig (1995) emphasises the fact that labelling of 
origin has an emotional effect, but does not have a signal effect. Consequently, origin is no t a 
signal of quality in itself when a consumer is evaluating a product. Price on the other hand is 
grasped as an indicator of quality. Furthermore, where consumers have predetermined 
stereotypes or attitudes towards certain countries of origin, such attitudes have proved to 
discriminate against products from developing countries. However, it is important to 
emphasise that the effect of country of origin labelling is very dependent on the product type, 
the price and changes over time. International branding and certification may create trust 
towards a product no matter where it is produced, and may even increase the reputation of a 
country. If the brand ´Nike`, which is normally associated with quality, is produced in China, 
                                                                 
90 This specific article does not emphasise traded goods directly, but focuses on price differences across borders. 
91 For arguments on common currency and currency volatility, look up Parsley and Wei (2000) on price 
differences, Rose (1999) and Frankel and Rose (2002) on trade flows. 
92 See Linders, Groot and Nijkamp (2002), Anderson (2001), Groot, Linders, Rietveld and Subramanian (2002), 
Anderson and Wincoop (2001), Anderson (1999), Anderson and Marcouiller (2000) for arguments by authors 
emphasising an institutional perspective. 
93 For the ´border effect` explained by preferences (among other factors), see Hillberry and Hummels (2002), and 
Wei (1996).  
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the ´made in China` label in combination with ´Nike` might increase the reputation of 
Chinese-produced products.94  
 If consumer preferences are a main source of the ´border effect` then one might 
observe a decline in the effect due to an increased amount of multinational companies that 
spread advertisements for similar products at an international level. The film and music 
industry may also homogenise preferences and erase the ´border effect`.  
 Not only individuals may prefer products from their home country, local governments 
are also known to prefer local products to stimulate the national economy. Trionfetti (2000) 
has investigated the home bias in government procurement, and he finds that imports from 
private consumers are always higher than governmental imports; yet the divide varies 
markedly between countries. This implies that government spending is biased towards the 
home market. He estimates that the average governmental procurement in industrialised 
countries is 10-12% of GDP. However, it is important to emphasise that the significance of 
such interventions in relation to international specialisation is very dependent on the sector in 
question. Sectors with constant returns to scale and perfect competition are not so much 
influenced by governmental procurement. Yet, companies that are characterised by increasing 
returns to scale and monopolistic competition may again distort international specialisation. 
The WTO and the EU have since 1977 tried to prevent local governments from exercising 
bias in favour of their home producers and to open avenues for competitors.  
 The ´border effect` has to originate either from the perspective that local preferences, 
demand and availability are important factors, or that there is some barrier to trade in the 
transactions between countries. Evans (2001) finds that consumer preferences are not a strong 
enough factor to explain the ´border effect`. She emphasises the importance of the ´barrier` 
factor, that there is some sort of hindrance between countries. The following explanations of 
the border effect are mainly such ´barrier effects`.    
3.3.2. Currency unions 
International trade involves exchange of currencies. Countries have their particular money, 
creating transaction costs when converting to other currencies. Prices are less transparent 
when stated in different money units. However, some countries remove this cost by entering 
currency unions.95  Estimations conducted by Frankel and Rose (2002) and Rose (1999) 
indicate that trade is over three times higher between common-currency countries, and that 
exchange rate volatility reduces trade, but to a much smaller degree. Consequently, the 
stabilising effect produced by equal currencies is not the main reason why monetary unions 
increase trade. If this were the case, exchange rate volatility would come out as a much more 
important variable. It is reasonable that volatility is a less important factor, since future 
payments can be contracted to a fixed currency, taking away the risk involved in currency 
volatility (forward contracts). However, hedging does not function in all countries, because 
some nations have malfunctioning credit markets. 
Rose (1999) argues that the ´home bias` effect can to a large extent be explained by 
the fact that there is only one currency inside country borders. This might be true; however, 
currency unions are normally created between countries that are natural trading partners, 
linked to each other through historical ties, personal bonds and connected borders. Frankel 
and Rose (2002) and Rose (1999) have tested for some of these variables. However, they do 
admit that historical links were not assessed and may be of importance. 
                                                                 
94 Arne Wiig (1995) has an interesting overview of the literature on country of origin.  
95 See Vårdal (1994) that elaborate on the effects of currency unions. 
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3.3.3. Contract  enforcement and institutions 
Insecurity in international exchange has been the focus for many authors attempting to explain 
the patterns of trade.96 Asset specificity can increase the risk and cost of opportunism. 
Specific investments are to some extent larger over country borders and longer distances. Site-
specific investments involve adjustments to the location of economic activity. If a company 
signs a contract with an agent in a foreign location, some investments need to be made. This 
can involve the translation of user manuals because of language differences, new design 
because of taste differences, or other dimensions/standards due to measurement differences. 
Physical asset-specific investments are also more predominant in international trade; larger 
adjustments to machinery are needed when the location has a different character. When 
Norwegian Seafood Exporters launched a fresh fish campaign in Moscow this year, new 
storage locations outside the capital were needed. Investments were made because the 
distance was too large to keep the products fresh. Human asset-specific investments are, 
following the same reasoning, more important in long-distance trade. An international trading 
company has to hire a workforce that, for example, has cultural knowledge, language skills or 
political knowledge about the trading region to make the most profitable transactions.  
This increased asset specificity renders business contracts more exposed to 
opportunism and the ´hold-up` problem. However, as discussed in section 2.1.3 institutions 
are needed to enforce contracts and/or trust so partners will co-operate. An argument put 
forward by Anderson and Marcouiller (2000) is that institutional quality can create a barrier to 
trade. If institutions are of poor quality, they may not be able to enforce contracts in a stable 
and efficient manner. Anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon is found in table 12. This table 
shows how 3,685 firms in 69 countries ranked ´the obstacles for doing business` in a survey 
conducted by the World Bank in 1996.  
 
Table 12: Ranking of ´Obstacles for Doing Business`97 
 Worldwide Sample 
Tax Regulations or High Taxes 1 
Corruption 2 
Financing 3 
Inadequate Infrastructure 4 
Crime and Theft 5 
Inflation 6 
Uncertainty of Costs of Regulation 7 
Policy Instability 8 
Labour Regulations 9 
Regulations of Foreign Trade 10 
Safety or Environmental Regulations 11 
Start-up Regulations 12 
Foreign Currency Regulations 13 
Price Controls 14 
Terrorism 15 
 
It is not that odd that businesses complain about taxes; however, that they put corruption in 
second place, with inadequate institutions, theft and crime not far behind, is more surprising. 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2000) do not use this table as evidence, but rather construct a 
                                                                 
96 This view can be observed in Anderson (2001), Groot, Linders, Rietveld and Subramanian (2002), Anderson 
and Marcouiller (2000). 
97 From Anderson and Marcouiller (2000), p.28. 
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structural model of import demand in an insecure world. The model derives data from the 
World Economic Forum, finding that a 10% rise in a country’s index of transparency and 
impartiality leads to a 5% increase in its import volume. Furthermore, Groot, Linders, 
Rietveld and Subramanian’s (2002) study of the effect of institutions on trade flows, using a 
gravity model approach, finds a 20% to 24% increase in bilateral trade due to institutional 
quality. Why is the quality of institutions so important? 
 Contract enforceability is an important factor, as mentioned above. Institutions that 
exercise bias in favour of their own country’s citizens, demand bribes or undertake outright 
theft increase the risk in transactions. Institutions need to be transparent, efficient and 
predictable to enforce contracts in a proper manner. Moreover, functioning formal institutions 
can create better informal institutions. Micro- level trust has better possibilities with 
predictable laws and stable governments. Macro-level trust can also be influenced by 
functioning institutions, creating good business norms. However, even more important is the 
possibility that foreign importers increase their confidence towards suppliers from countries 
that have good governance and well- functioning institutions. This macro- level trust towards a 
country can give benefits to the whole economy, due to the increased security given by 
predictable institutions that can enforce contracts. 
International institutions can create enforcement of cross-border contracts; however, these 
institutions are either non-existent or not strong enough. Yet, some institutions are present in 
this arena. International commercial arbitration offers private means of dispute resolution. The 
London Court of International Arbitration (in London), the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC, in Paris) and the American Arbitration Association (in London) are for the 
most part used in this context. These institutions guarantee neutrality. However, a lawsuit can 
be so expensive that this solution will not be an alternative for smaller companies. Letters of 
credit are bank guarantees making it possible for the trading parties to shift some of their 
commercial credit risk to the issuing bank and allowing the buyer to postpone the payment 
until the shipment passes through quality inspection. 98 This is a good option for preventing 
some of the risk induced by trade. However, this assumes a functioning financial market and 
businesses that the banks are willing to guarantee. Homogenisation of international trade laws 
can create better conditions for contract enforcement. Many countries follow the international 
rules called ´lex mercatoria`,99 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is expanding in size. 
However, these international organisations are not strong enough; local institutions still play 
an important role in dispute resolution. I am not claiming one should abolish local 
governments, and many benefits arise from smaller governmental regions. However, this 
discussion is beyond the scope of this report. 
 Another aspect of institutions investigated by Groot, Linders, Rietveld and 
Subramanian (2002) is based on the similarity of institutions, not the quality. When countries 
have similar laws, legal procedures and levels of transparency, it might be easier to interact 
with each other. The transaction is less prone to cultural misunderstandings and fewer 
resources are needed to interpret contracts due to similarities. Familiarity may also increase 
bilateral trust when the co-partners’ signals are easier to interpret. Empirically, the 
significance of similar institutions is not as strong as we find attributable to the quality of 
institutions, yet the authors find a 12% to 18% increase in bilateral trade with similar 
institutions. 
 The problem of contract enforcement on an international level may explain some of 
the border effect, where borders create a limit between institutional regions. However, 
contract enforcement does not need to materialise through strong institutions. Trust can 
                                                                 
98 Letters of credit are discussed in Rauch (2001) 
99 http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/index.html 
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enforce contracts. This is a cornerstone for another explanation of the trade mystery, the 
network/search view. 
3.4. Network/search view of trade 
A line of reasoning that is especially interesting is the network hypothesis emphasised in 
recent articles by James Rauch. I believe that this view is essential to understanding why less 
trade is observed over longer distances and over country borders. However, the arguments 
mentioned earlier may still be valid and function at the same time as the network/search view.  
3.4.1. Search  
As mentioned in section 2.1.1, transactions involve search costs. This is the cost necessary to 
find a potential trading partner. Rauch (2001) argues that differentiated goods are especially 
exposed to search costs.  Differentiated goods are not found in an organised market (as 
standardised goods) and do not have reference prices. The price is negotiated through 
knowledge about the quality of the product, delivery time and the qualifications of the  
producers. Differentiated products are consequently more dependent on personal interaction 
than standardised goods (such as steel and oil) that can be bought in an organised market. The 
search/network approach towards trade is predominantly adapted to differentiated goods.100 
Trust is assumed to be more important when differentiated products are traded. Since contacts 
often last over longer periods, and quality is not standardised, the hazard of opportunism is 
larger. Consequently, with higher risk the need for assurance about the other party’s 
trustworthiness (the deliberation problem) is essential to doing business with these products. 
Search costs can increase under international conditions.101 The reason for this is that 
potential trading partners are harder to find owing to little information, cultural differences 
and language barriers. It is also assumed that international trade involves a higher degree of 
asset specificity, something that may increase risk in transactions. On a national basis 
institutions are more frequently present to help businesses in a search process, through 
business organisations, and governmental advisory boards. Directories such as the ´yellow 
pages` are also predominantly based on national sectors. Product fairs are usually national or 
regional. 102 These locations create durable business contacts and networks. Institutions that 
help to reduce search costs are scarcer on an international level, although found to some 
extent on a regional level (as in the EU).  
 A solution to this search cost and deliberation problem is to trade in a pre-existing 
network. Networks consist of trusting relationships where the hazard of opportunism is 
minimised. These networks may function as search engines, giving personal information 
about market conditions and business opportunities in their respective locations. However, 
such pre-existing ties are more commonly local due to the fact that most people grow up in 
one location, creating relationships at school, in their neighbourhood, through sports, clubs, 
and religious activity. Lorenzen (1998) investigated the Danish industrial district in West 
Jutland in Denmark and found that proximity created the possibility for the most information-
intensive type of trust, micro- level trust. Consequently, the problem of search when potential 
business contacts are far away in geographical distance is that there is less information about 
these agents. This lack of information can occur due to a home bias in news and television 
coverage, and fewer personal ties creating fewer rumours and reputational effects.103  
                                                                 
100 Rauch (2001), Rauch (1996), Rauch (1999) and Rangan and Lawrence (1999) focus on differentiated goods. 
101 For more information on search costs internationally see Rauch (1999) and Rangan and Lawrence (1999). 
102 Product fairs are markets where suppliers and producers present their products and profiles. 
103 Porters, Rey and Oh (2001) elaborated a hypothesis saying that distance is a proxy for informational frictions. 
They emphasise that countries situated close to each other have more on each other. This is either due to direct 
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 However, we should not forget the development in information and communication 
technology (ICT), as mentioned in the introduction. The Internet gives access to search 
engines, making it possible to see business alternatives in destinations all over the world. The 
costs of information are reduced and the time needed to process huge amounts of data is 
minimised. Producers that need standardised inputs should benefit greatly from such 
technological advances, where search engines can find the cheapest product. Some companies 
choose to differentiate their products, so that consumers have more trouble comparing the 
prices. However, modern technology does not yet monitor whether someone is trustworthy. 
Products that are dependent on specifications and quality inspection are still exposed to a 
costly search process. Leamer and Storper (2001) argue that the Internet allows for long-
distance ´conversations`, not ´handshakes`, indicating that ICT is not adapted to starting 
relationships or networks, but can maintain such relationships. We might see a diminishing 
´distance effect` in the future due to the ongoing initiatives to create ´trust guarantees` and 
electronic signatures over the Internet, a type of branding of a promise of trustworthy transfer. 
An investigation of ICT’s influence on distance could be an interesting approach for further 
research. A possible scope could be to look at the friction variable, b , found in equation (1). 
This variable represents the friction in distance, capturing other factors than the mere 
geographical distance. This parameter could be gathered from all the available gravity studies, 
creating a meta-analysis. This could indicate if the beta value has changed over time, thus 
pointing to the possible trends. If frictions are diminishing, this could imply that ICT is 
reducing search costs.104 
 Developments in modern technology are not equal around the world: poor countries 
are not endowed with the same frequency of computers, telephones and other communication 
equipment, a frequency that is simply not affordable. Physical access is only one aspect of 
how ICT permeates a society. The consumers need the knowledge and right language skills to 
use the technology efficiently. One should consequently not expect that long-distance trade is 
severely altered by ICT at the present stage of development. Maybe the communication 
revolution has strengthened already developed relationships, creating a development towards 
greater local bias? This is in part the conclusion made by Brun, Carrere, Guillaumont and 
Melo (2002) in their investigation of distance and trade. They have conducted a similar 
analysis to the one I have suggested in the last paragraph. Observations were gathered over a 
long period of time from 1962-96 from 130 countries and analysed in a panel gravity model. 
This is consequently not a meta analysis, yet it captures the development of b  (the elasticity 
of bilateral trade to distance) over a longer period of time. In their analyses they use a 
standard and augmented trade-barrier function. The standard function is similar to other trade 
barrier specifications discussed earlier in this analysis. However, the augmented function 
considered other factors such as the real price of oil, an index of quality of infrastructure and 
the share of primary exports in total trade. An interesting conclusion from their study was that 
when they divided their sample between rich and poor countries (R-R, P-P) there was 
evidence of an increasing importance of distance between poor countries in both the standard 
and augmented function. However, between rich countries the elasticity of bilateral trade to 
distance was constant in the standard function and decreasing in the augmented function. This 
may imply that globalisation is marginalizing poor countries and reducing the importance of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
interaction between their citizens, because of media coverage, or because they tend to learn each other’s 
languages. 
104 A meta analysis could be interesting to compare the results found by Rose (1999), who estimated that the 
elasticity of distance had not changed over the last 20 years, and had not been significantly affected by 
communication and transportation improvements. 
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distance between rich countries. Whether this is due to the widespread use of ICT in 
developed countries can only be the subject of speculation, but should be studied further.105  
 In the following section I will explore further the concept of networks and look at the 
positive and negative effects of this phenomenon. 
3.4.2. Networks  
An economic network can be defined as a group of agents that pursue repeated and enduring 
exchange relations with one another.106 Of the international networks, the most easily 
observed are the co-ethnic networks. Estimations by Rauch and Trindade (1999) show that 
trade has increased by 150% in differentiated products within the Chinese network.107 Co-
ethnic networks are most commonly spread through migration. Dunlevy and Hutchinson 
(2001) proclaim that there are three effects of migration on trade. Firstly, one can observe a 
taste effect. New residents lack the products from their home community and they start to 
import these products. Secondly, an information bridge may be created: immigrants establish 
new business opportunities through knowledge about price differences and qualities. 
Ultimately, there is the network effect based on trust and mutual understanding of another 
culture. These three factors contribute to increase trade. Furthermore, a study conducted by 
Gould (1994) on the ´immigrant effect` in the US shows that the export impact was larger 
than the import impact, indicating that the impact of business contacts is larger than the 
impact of taste. If the taste effect was predominant, the import impact would be larger. This 
underpins the conclusion that trade effects due to migration are created by their international 
networks. Two factors are especially important in the context of networks: information and 
trust. 
Networks can create an information bridge through their participants. The information is 
personal and hence does not need to be interpreted or ´decoded`. Interpersonal relationships 
can function as information channels giving trustworthy information about the past conduct of 
other economic agents. It is not easy to verify whether a potential business partner has ever 
breached a contract. However, networks can easily convey such information, due to personal 
monitoring over long time periods.108 Networks can also give information about markets in 
general, making it easier for faraway producers to pick up trends, new demand trends and 
price differences. Knowledge about price differences in distant locations can create profitable 
arbitrage. An example of this type of information bridge can be found in the Korean wig 
industry, where producers in Korea depend on their Korean participants in the American 
market, because the American market is in this case the most innovative and trend-setting.109 
Information about the new styles is rapidly conveyed back to the producers in Korea, making 
it possible to keep up with new demands. 
  Trust is another important component in networks. Micro-level trust can flourish in 
networks due to frequent interactions and knowledge transfer about each other’s past conduct. 
Some also claim that this micro- level trust is created in networks due to the possibility of 
punishing group members that act inappropriately. Trust towards external traders can also 
arise because there is a mutual understanding that if the external trader acts opportunistically, 
there will be no future deals with the whole network. It is debatable whether we are really 
discussing trust in this case; one can argue that this is a power situation. However, positive 
expectations about future conduct can be created when there is a threat of punishment. 
Sanction mechanisms are not often observed in networks (however, are common in the 
                                                                 
105 ICT in the context of transaction costs is discussed in Linders, Groot and Nijkamp (2002). 
106 Rauch (2001) uses this definit ion. 
107 The increase of 150% is trade within south-east Asia 
108 Fafchamps (1999) elaborates further on networks for transmitting information. 
109 This example can be found in Rauch (2001) and Hsing (1999). 
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Mafia).110 Yet, historical evidence of such conduct is available. The Maghribi traders 
mentioned earlier in this report used a multilateral punishment mechanism to freeze out 
traders that acted opportunistically. The German Hansa network from 1200-1300 showed a 
similar type of conduct. They boycotted towns that maltreated participants of their network. 
However, creating such a boycott was not an easy process in the beginning of the Hansa 
epoch. They had problems convincing their trading partners that their sanctions were credible, 
but with time they managed to co-ordinate responses. The Hansa network was a mixture of 
self-enforced and state-enforced mechanisms.111  
 Micro- level trust is prevalent when we are discussing sanction mechanisms in 
networks, yet meso-level trust may also create the basis for networks. Meso- level trust is 
founded in similarity, stereotypes and ethnicity. An initial trust can be created in a Chinese 
network if an external trader of Chinese origin looks up a business opportunity in such a 
network. It might be more difficult to create the initial “leap of trust” if the external trader is 
of Indian or Italian origin. However, meso- level trust may, through frequent interaction, 
develop into micro- level trust. As discussed earlier, trust is not a static concept; it can change 
over time. Trust at all the different levels may reduce the problems of contract enforcement 
and opportunism, and make individuals in networks more prone to co-operate. 
 Does the ´lack of trade` originate from the phenomenon that we do not find trust over 
long distances? Trust is harder to create over longer distances, and meso-level trust will 
obviously be reduced by distance because the probability of finding people that are related, 
belong to the same social group or have the same ethnic background is reduced. Micro-level 
trust demands high information costs, and is cheaper to create in proximate regions. Macro-
level trust can go both ways; it depends on the reputation of the social institution, the people 
in the faraway location, and the norms and values in the home country. The effect of trust and 
borders has been examined by Helliwell (1996), who studied the level of trust in Canada and 
the US in his article ´Do borders matter for social capital?` His conclusion indicated that 
national borders did have a significant effect on trust. The level of trust differed between the 
two countries, but also, to a lesser extent, internally in the different states and provinces. 
People may feel a stronger identity and altruism towards individuals of the same country. 
There can exist a sentiment of cognitive distance towards individuals living outside the 
frontiers. Yet, the author claims that a more finely masked investigation would clarify the 
variations of trust in smaller areas. He uses an example from Minnesota where the level of 
trust is higher than the national average. In this state one-third of the population has 
Norwegian ancestors, and Norway has, according to comparable WVS 112 data, trust levels 
among the highest in the world. Migrating groups can create regional differences in trust. This 
indicates that local networks are important when migrating groups with high levels of trust 
continue to maintain this level through generations. 
Consequently, trust may directly explain some of the distance and border effect. 
Distance reduces the sentiment of trust owing to less interaction and poorer information. 
Borders limit trust because trusting networks are predominantly on a local level within 
national frontiers. Many countries have built up a national sentiment that can create a higher 
degree of altruism inside country borders.   
3.4.3. The exclusionary effects of networks 
Networks have positive effects, facilitating trade through contract enforcement and 
information flows. Rangan and Lawrence (1999) tested the hypothesis that international 
                                                                 
110 There is only weak empirical evidence that business networks conduct collective punishments for 
opportunistic reneges of contracts, see Fafchamps (1999) 
111 Historical research about networks can be found in Greif (2000). 
112 World Values Survey of 1990-91. 
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networks are more responsive and adaptable than arms- length trade. They investigated US 
imports by MNCs113 to see if they adapted more efficiently to changes in relative prices114 due 
to their international network. Rangan and Lawrence (1999) assume that MNCs have more 
information available because they have firms in different countries in direct contact with 
local networks. Their estimations are based on a gravity equation and are represented in 
appendix 5. The results produced by this equation show that MNCs exhibited speedier and 
more vigorous responses to exchange rates. The international companies could use the 
changes to obtain economic benefits in a faster way by gaining first-hand trustworthy 
information from their networks. However, only members of the network will gain from these 
benefits. This reminds us of the negative effects of networks; they may be exclusionary.  
This exclusionary character of networks was mentioned in section 2.1.5. However, 
some further comments will be made here. The degree of exclusion in networks depends on 
the type of network. Closed networks are often based on micro- or meso- level trust, 
originating from kinship and family bonds. These networks are more prone to exclude new 
opportunities and are less advantageous in a bigger context. Bowles and Gintis (2001) use a 
game theory framework to explain the dynamics of trust and exclusion in (closed) networks. 
They describe economic networks as illustrated in figure 6. The inner circle represents 
insiders that share common characteristics such as race, ethnic identity, political orientation, 
religion or more trivial similarities. These insiders co-operate only with others in the network, 
and exclude others with certain characteristics, making a group of ´others` or outsiders. This 
filter of exclusionary practices is called parochialism. The exclusion of certain trading 
partners reduces the possibility of making profits, so there has to be a gain to this segregation. 
The advantage is increased trust ins ide the network, and consequently reduced transaction 
costs.115  
An example of this exclusionary filter can be found in the Amish society116 in the US. 
The Amish society draws a boundary between the church and the world through old-fashioned 
clothing, language, interiors and cultural codes. However, the boundaries around the Amish 
culture have not prevented it from achieving economic success and population growth. In this 
                                                                 
113 Multinational corporations. 
114 Exchange rate differences. 
115 Also mentioned by Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom (2002). 
116 Jacob Amman founded Amish Church, also called Pennsylvania Dutch in Switzerland in the 1690s. The 
Amish Church is a closed, fundamentalist religious society now only found in the United States. Characteristic 
because of the old-fashioned clothing and prohibitive behaviour towards all modern agricultural equipment 
Aschehoug and Gyldendal, (1990), p.284). 
Figure 6: Exclusionary practices in networks
Insider
Outsider
Exclusionary practices (parochialism)
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example, we find very little contact between insiders and outsiders, but there are networks 
that are less restrictive with their exclusionary practices. These networks are again 
characterised by a lower level of trust.  
Open networks can be beneficial to society in general. More people may benefit from 
the advantages made by the network. Noorderhaven, Koen and Beugelsdijik (2002) 
summarise several empirical and theoretical studies of networks, and find that the 
organisational culture is important to determining the quality of ties between a firm and its 
transaction partners. The organisation culture of aggressiveness and action orientation could 
create expanding and open networks. Figure 7 gives an indication of how such a network 
works. However, this is not a common trait in networks. The definition of networks as a 
´group of agents that pursue repeated enduring exchange relations with one another` explains 
some of the reasons why networks are more frequently closed. Repeated relations can 
establish a cumulative process of learning and micro-level trust, where dependencies are a 
natural consequence. The switching- in, switching-out of relations can be costly, hence 
creating ´sticky` relations. Dixit (2002) created a model of the world, showing that when the 
world increased in size, the promise of co-operation became less credible because there were 
more alternative partners. So, open networks can tend to be characterised by less trust and co-
operation.   
 I argued that the ´lack of trade` internationally originates from the search problem. 
Information and knowledge about individuals’ trustworthiness is harder to obtain in 
international trade. I assume there is a higher risk when trade is conducted over borders, 
which makes trust an even more important factor. Firms find their business opportunities in 
networks where information and trust are cheaper. However, due to the fact that networks are 
predominantly local and are frequently closed, trade will be reduced over longer distances. 
 On a theoretical basis, little has been developed in the search/network approach. 
However, Casella and Rauch (1997) have made a promising beginning. 
3.4.4. A theoretical approach 
Casella and Rauch (1997) have constructed a general equilibrium model for differentiated 
products, inspired by the trade networks found in East Asia. The model is not easily tractable 
and should be simplified in the future to make it more accessible for expansion. The model is 
a matching model where two separate pools of information are linked through general 
Links to outsiders
Figure 7: Open networks
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equilibrium interdependence. One pool is the home market with information at nominal cost 
and with sellers well aware of how to reach the buyers that form their particular market 
niches. Consequently, information is complete. Nevertheless, an agent in the home market has 
more difficulty in discovering variety, capabilities and quality in the foreign market because 
of the lack of information. Casella and Rauch (1997) model this phenomenon, saying that 
matching is random when undertaken towards agents in foreign countries. However, when an 
agent has group ties, these information barriers are overcome. A member of a group has 
complete information about the foreign group members. The group is given exogenously, so 
others cannot enter into the group. Consequently, the endowment of information is 
exogenously given for all the agents. Consumers are held in the background in this model. If 
the match is successful in terms of the quality of the differentiated product, the agents split the 
generated surplus developed by the match. If the match is not that good, they revert to their 
next best opportunity. This next best opportunity is assumed to be at home. In this setup, 
clearly, the more people with group ties, the larger the volume of trade.  
 I find it plausible to assume that group ties are to a large extent local and regional, not 
spread randomly as assumed by Casella and Rauch (1997). The Chinese network represents 
an example of an international network, increasing long-distance trade. However, I find that 
these networks are more the exception than the rule. Consequently, trade is not increased 
internationally by networks. I find it reasonable that networks reduce international trade, 
because networks are predominantly local and closed. The increased trust and information 
level towards local economic agents freezes out other participants outside this sphere. This 
can be understood as a three-country world where networks exist between two countries. The 
third country does not overcome the information barriers and trade is diverted away from this 
country. I find this a plausible explanation of why we find less trade over longer distances, 
because trusted networks are more frequently local than international.  
3.5. Policy discussion 
There seems to be present a trade barrier in international trade that cannot be measured by 
transportation costs and tariff barriers. It is of utmost importance to clarify the main reasons 
for this trade impediment, so as to find the best policy solution. In this report mistrust is 
considered to be the essential boundary in long-distance trade, and the policy discussion will 
assume that the search/network view is the most reasonable explanation. Clearly, one also has 
to consider the goals for a policy recommendation. A reduction of a hindrance to trade will 
generate a world with freer flows of goods and services. I will not discuss whether freer trade 
is most beneficial for the world population. This is an issue most economists take for granted, 
that freer trade will stimulate growth and reduce poverty. However, other opinions are present 
in this discussion. Given the objective that freer trade is positive, and that this ´invisible` trade 
barrier is caused by fewer trustworthy relations over distance, I will discuss some possible 
measures for reducing the barrier.  
 Firstly, an alternative means of creating trust could be an external implementation of a 
´leap of confidence`. This is the small portion of risk that has to be taken from one of the 
parties in a transaction if there is no form of social trust present. To be credible, such risk 
reduction should be conducted by one of the participants in a transaction, so political 
measures may seem difficult. Yet, governments can help companies by organising export 
campaigns and using their networks through their embassies to promote their national 
products. This help through commercial activity can develop such a ´leap of confidence` 
needed to start a transaction with a foreign company. However, these types of intervention are 
not consistent with a fair competition policy, and are not favoured by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). International banks with a high reputation can also generate a ´leap of 
confidence` by issuing guarantees and warranties. A company will more easily interact with a 
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firm that has guarantees from a credible financial institution. The General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) has made it easier to provide financial services worldwide. This 
may benefit companies in developing countries that need guarantees, warranties or credits and 
are surrounded by a malfunctioning financial market. A stable, transparent and consistent 
world institution such as the WTO may function as a credible third party that can enforce 
international contracts and consequently create trust. This cannot be seen as a ´leap of 
confidence` since it does not originate from within the transaction, but it is nonetheless a 
factor that can promote trust in international trade.  
 Secondly, there are ways that the market participants can create trust without the help 
of external institutions such as the WTO and local governments. One solution is to fabricate a 
trustworthy brand name. ´Black&Decker` is an example of a brand name; every drill they 
produce is the same patent and quality. If a customer is satisfied with a specific drill, he will 
transfer these positive expectations to other products produced by ´Black&Decker`. 
Consequently, a good reputation manifested over time can be transmitted to a great variety of 
products.  If one can prove that the product has survived for a long period of time, advertising 
that it has existed ´since 1850`, there is a greater possibility of transmitting trust to the 
customer.  
Another form of branding is the franchise system, where services are offered at 
different locations with different local owners. However, a fee is paid to the parent company 
owning the concept. ´Meineke` is an example of a franchise that offers the service of car 
repair. If we suppose a motorist is driving through Iowa and his car breaks down, what car 
repair company would he choose? Joe’s Auto Repair or Meineke? Whom would he trust the 
most? The answer is most probably the franchise company. There is a possibility that the 
motorist has had prior experiences with the same company, or there is trust due to the fact that 
the franchisee owning this particular outlet is pressured by the parent company to deliver a 
certain quality. In this case the franchise functions as a middleman between the customer and 
the franchisee.117  
                                                                 
117 This example is also illustrated in Klein (1997). 
 
Textbox 2: Brand names: “ Stressless” 
Jens Petter Ekornes is leader of Norway’s largest furniture industry, with 
1700 employees. The company had great success in the 1980s with the brand  
name ´stressless` (leather chairs). He claimed in the Norwegian magazine 
´økonomisk report` that he had a rule in life: ´ one should not have more 
business than one has trust to manage, no more, no less. Trust, he said, was 
the biggest value to own, and it cannot be observed in the balance of 
payments. To build this trust, especially in the case of a brand name, the 
consumers have to know us personally, and have confidence in us. They have 
to trust our intentions, our dealings with people, how we think and how we 
work` ( Haavik 2002, p.42). Hence, trust is especially important when a 
brand name is involved. 
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This brings forward the final point that a market can develop middleman services that 
may reduce the problem of mistrust and consequently reduce transaction costs. Such 
middleman services are, for example, financial services, logistics firms such as FedEx and 
UPS or multinational retailers such as Hennes and Maurits and WalMart that have frequent 
dealings with consumers and suppliers, creating a bridge of trust in the market. Consumers 
know the products and the quality they can expect in these stores and the suppliers know the 
requirements that are expected of them. The GATS agreement has structured the international 
laws for financial, transportation, trading, telecommunications and professional services. 
 To summarise, if the ´lack of trade` over distance is caused by a lack of trust, then the 
market can to some extent create its own solutions through branding, franchising and 
middleman services. However, if an enormous number of brands are designed, they might not 
have a trust-creating effect because there is a lack of information. Institutions like the WTO 
can create a more stable and transparent system that may spur trust between trading partners. 
Yet, this would demand more resources for such an international system. If trade is not 
reduced by a barrier but is caused by preferences in the home countries, these measures would 
not have an impact, and one can do little to prevent the ´border` and ´distance effect`. 
These sectors are growing in the developed world and are increasingly traded across 
borders. Some of these services can facilitate trade transactions in markets that have unstable 
financial markets and communication lines. Developing countries may earn from such a 
process by increasing the possibility of getting credible warranties, guarantees and stable 
telephone and communication lines. However, critics claim that developing countries will be 
landed with expensive systems from the North, creating an advantage only for the companies 
in the rich countries and the rich population in the poor world. The consequences of further 
trade in services are not clear, but one should not expect services to be greatly different from 
trade in goods. Economists generally agree that trade creates welfare benefits for all parties 
that are involved in a trade transaction. 
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4. Conclusion 
In the introduction I asked the question ´Why do Norwegians trade more with Germans than 
Ecuadorians?` This is a phenomenon I have tried to address in this report. It seems like a very 
simple issue; still, it has many puzzling aspects. The intriguing part is that transportation costs 
and formal barriers cannot explain why we trade so much more with countries in near 
proximity.  
 Several reasons are emphasised in the literature, and some of them have been 
presented in this report. The main focus has been on trust and information, a source of 
explanation I find very plausible. This view focuses on the increased search costs that are 
induced under international transactions. The costs increase because potential traders tend to 
have less information about distant locations, and there is a diminishing probability of finding 
trustworthy trading partners.  
 Trust can function as a safeguard in transactions, creating co-operation between 
individuals in situations entailing risk. International trade can be assumed to be more risky 
than national trade, making safeguards more important. Yet, trust is difficult to create over 
longer distances owing to the reduced probability of finding individuals sharing the same 
characteristics e.g. the same language, ethnicity, religion and culture, factors that create a 
meso- level type of trust. An interpersonal type of trust is also more frequent in proximate 
regions, because this type of trust is dependent on frequent interactions, which are more 
probable in the local environment. 
  Networks can diminish search costs, because of trusting relationships and 
interpersonal information. This again reduces trade over distance, because networks are 
frequently local, and absorb some of the possible trade with foreign countries. International 
networks do exist, facilitating trade over national borders; yet, this is not a common 
phenomenon. 
 Another interesting phenomenon discussed in this report is the ability of information 
and communication technology (ICT) to reduce search costs and the ´distance effect`. The 
differing consequences for standardised and differentiated goods are emphasised. 
Standardised goods have a fixed price and can be exchanged on an organised market. I argue 
that ICT will reduce the search costs for these products, due to the effective search engines 
and marketplaces that have been created through use of the Internet. Some scepticism is 
articulated when it comes to differentiated goods. These are dependent on quality inspection 
and contract specifications, and are not suitable for trade on a spot market. These transactions 
are more dependent on trust and will probably be less influenced by ICT. The reason for this 
is that modern communications at the present stage mostly convey objective information, not 
personal trustworthy information. ICT can function as a good way to maintain contacts, but is 
less capable of initiating trustworthy relationships. However, there are initiatives around the 
world to create systems of trust adapted to the Internet so as to reduce this problem. 
 Finally, to conclude: we trust our familiar network more than distant relations, 
reducing the possibility of long-distance trade. ICT has not yet created a possibility of 
transmitting ´handshakes`, hence, distance is not yet dead. 
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6. Appendices 
 
A1) Communication and Computer Costs, 1960-2000118 
Year Cost of a 3-minute Telephone Call, New 
York to London 
(in 2000 US$) 
Price of Computers and Peripheral 
Equipment Relative to GDP deflator 
(2000 = 1000) 
1960 60.42 1,869,004 
1970 41.61 199,983 
1980 6.32 27,983 
1990 4.37 7,275 
2000 0.40 1,000 
 
 
A2) Transport costs, 1830-1990119 
Ocean Transport Year 
Wheat, Percent  
of Production Costs 
Ocean Freight  
1920 = 100 
Average Air 
Transportation 
Revenue per 
Passenger Mile (in 
1990 US$) 
1830 79   
1850 76   
1880 41   
1910 27.5   
1920  100  
1930  65 0.68 
1940  67 0.46 
1950  38 0.30 
1960  28 0.24 
1970  29 0.16 
1980  25 0.10 
1990  30 0.11 
 
 
A3) The ´rational model` of trust  
With trigger strategies and assuming the other player co-operates, the pay-off to a player if he 
co-operates, is å
¥
=1
3
t
td . Similarly, if he deviates, the pay-off is ( )å
¥
=
-+
1
15
t
td . For co-
operation to be at equilibrium, we then need: 
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t dd åå
¥
=
¥
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-+³
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Solving yields: 
                                                                 
118 World Economic Outlook, May 1997, table 11, updated to 2000; U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, cited from Masson (2001), p.6. 
119 Table from World Economic Outlook, May 1997, table 11, supplemented with some data from Baldwin and 
Martin (1999), cited in Masson (2001), p. 5. The first column represents the share of costs used on ocean 
transport when producing wheat. The second column shows the price reduction in ocean freight in relation to 
1920. The third column indicates the average air transportation revenue per passenger mile. 
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A4) Commodity Export Dependence Greater that 50% for Developing Countries, 
1997120 
Commodities as % of 
Merchandise Exports 
Countries 
1980 1997 unless 
otherwise stated 
Leading Commodities 
Africa (39)  
Mauritania 99.6 99.9 Iron ore, fishery 
Chad 85.4 99.9 Cotton, meat 
Sao Tome and Principe … 99.9 Cocoa, copra, coffee 
Gabon 95.2 98.1 Fuels, manganese ore, wood  
Angola 87.1 97.7 Fuels 
Rwanda 99.6 97.7 Coffee, tea, tin ore 
Niger 98.0 97.6 (1996) Uranium, livestock  
Nigeria 99.7 97.4 Fuels 
Congo, Rep. 93.3 97.3 Fuels, wood, sugar  
Algeria 99.7 97.2 Fuels 
Sudan 99.2 97.2 Cotton, animals, sesame seeds  
Libya 99.6 96.1 (1991) Fuels 
Guinea-Bissau 91.8 95.8 Nuts, fishery 
Burundi 96.3 95.7 Coffee, tea 
Somalia … 95.5 Live animals, fishery, bananas 
Benin 96.6 95.4 (1996) Cotton, fuels 
Gambia 93.2 92.8 Peanuts, fish, cotton lint, palm 
kernels 
Malawi 93.6 92.7 Tobacco, tea, sugar 
Ghana 99.1 92.3 (1992) Cocoa, aluminium, wood 
Cameroon 96.2 92.0 Fuels, wood, coffee 
Ethiopia 99.8 88.8 Coffee 
Zambia 84.0 88.5 Copper, zinc 
Mali 98.7 83.9 Cotton, gold 
Mozambique 81.8 83.3 Fishery, nuts, cotton 
Guinea 99.3 82.5 (1996) Bauxite, aluminium 
Togo 89.4 80.5 Phosphate rock, cotton, coffee 
Tanzania 85.9 78.2 (1996) Coffee, cotton, cashew nuts, 
minerals, tobacco, sisal 
Kenya 87.9 74.4 Tea, coffee, fuels 
Burkina Faso 89.2 73.7 Cotton 
Madagascar 93.7 72.1 Coffee, vanilla, cloves, shellfish, 
sugar 
Uganda 99.3 70.7 Coffee, cotton 
Zimbabwe 64.2 70.4 Tobacco, nickel, cotton 
                                                                 
120 From World Bank, Statistical Information Management and Analysis (1999). 
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Merchandise Exports 
Countries 
1980 1997 unless 
otherwise stated 
Leading Commodities 
Côte d’Ivoire 95.3 70.0 Cocoa, fuels, wood 
Namibia … 69.2 Diamonds, metals, uranium, 
cattle, fish, skins 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 89.1 59.7 Fuels, cotton, aluminium 
Sierra Leone 60.1 57.8 (1996) Diamonds, futile, cocoa, coffee, 
fish 
Central African Republic 73.8 57.4 Wood, live animals, cotton 
Morocco 76.0 50.6 Food, beverages, phosphates 
Senegal 84.9 50.2 Fish, nuts, petroleum, 
phosphates, cotton 
Asia (15)  
Yemen, Rep. 53.0 99.4 Fuels 
Papua New Guinea 96.8 96.0 (1993) Gold, copper ore, oil, logs, 
coffee, palm oil, cocoa 
Saudi Arabia 99.4 90.6 Fuels 
Mongolia … 89.8 Copper ore, live animals, wood 
Myanmar 92.8 89.6 (1991) Wood, pulses, rice 
Kuwait 89.6 85.5 Fuels 
Oman 97.1 83.4 Petroleum, fish 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 95.2 83.2 Fuels 
Syrian Arab Republic 93.4 82.6 Fuels 
Laos 65.5 71.3 (1996) Wood, live animals, coffee 
Cambodia 35.8 65.8 Wood, rubber, soybeans 
Vietnam 86.5 63.7 (1996) Crude oil, marine products, rice, 
coffee, rubber, tea 
Indonesia 98.0 57.7 Fuel, rubber 
Philippines 79.0 55.4 Coconut oil, sugar 
Jordan 66.2 51.3 Phosphates, fertilisers, potash, 
agricultural products 
Latin America and  
Caribbean regions (17) 
 
Ecuador 97.0 91.2 Fuels, banana, fishery 
Venezuela 98.3 88.0 Fuels, aluminium, iron ore 
Paraguay 88.2 84.8 Cotton, soybeans 
Chile 90.9 84.4 Copper, fishery 
Bolivia 97.1 84.1 Metals, natural gas, soybeans, 
wood 
Peru 83.2 83.5 Metals, fishmeal, petroleum, 
coffee, cotton 
Panama 91.1 82.6 Bananas, shrimps, sugar, coffee 
Nicaragua 86.2 75.4 Coffee, seafood, meat, sugar, 
gold, bananas 
Costa Rica 71.1 74.6 Coffee, bananas, textiles, sugar 
Honduras 87.5 72.5 Banana, coffee, fishery 
Guatemala 75.8 69.8 Coffee, sugar, bananas, 
cardamom, petroleum 
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Colombia 80.4 69.1 Fuels, coffee, banana 
Argentina 76.8 65.8 Meat, wheat, corn, oilseeds, fuels 
Uruguay 62.1 63.1 Wool, meats, rice, fish and 
shellfish 
El Salvador 69.6 61.2 Coffee, sugar, shrimps 
Guyana … 61.0 Sugar, rice, bauxite 
Trinidad and Tobago 95.0 56.2 Fuels, sugar 
Europe & Central Asia 
(12) 
 
Armenia … 87.0 Gold, aluminium 
Kazakhstan … 82.2 (1996) Oil, metals, grain, meat, coal, 
wool 
Turkmenistan … 78.1 (1996) Natural gas, cotton, petroleum 
Moldova … 77.3 Foodstuffs, wine, tobacco 
Russian Federation … 76.8 Petroleum, natural gas, wood and 
metals 
Ukraine … 73.3 Metals, food 
Tajikistan … 73.2 Cotton, aluminium, fruits, 
vegetable oil 
Azerbaijan … 73.2 (1996) Oil and gas, cotton 
Bulgaria … 64.5 (1996) Agriculture and food, metals, 
minerals, fuels 
Kyrgyz Republic … 61.6 Wool, cotton, meat, gold, 
uranium, tobacco, mercury 
Georgia … 57.8 Citrus fruits, tea wine and other 
agricultural products, metals 
Macedonia, FYR … 54.2 Food, beverages, tobacco 
 
 
A5) Estimation in the investigation by Rangan and Lawrence (1999)121: 
.
****
***
./&
.Im...*Im..)7(
ijtijtijtijtt
ijtitijtitijijt
RateExchMNESalesDigRLaggedForeTime
RateExchSizeporterFirmRateExchGDPSUportsSU
qhze
dgba
++++
+++=
 
 
The subscript i, j and t, represent industry, country and year. All variables are entered in 
natural logs, except the time trend and the R&D/Sales ratios. The coefficients of the time 
trend and the R&D/Sales ratios represent the elasticity of US imports to a one percent increase 
in the respective independent variables.  
                                                                 
121 For specifications of the equation see Rangan and Lawrence (1999) p. 21. 
  
Summary 
 
This report explores the facts behind the buzzwords 
´globalisation` and ´the new economy`. In general we 
associate these concepts with a borderless world where 
economic transactions are managed through rapid 
electronic communication. This notion is questioned in 
this report, which presents an overview of investigations 
that have been conducted on trade flows. They conclude 
that trade is drastically reduced by distance and borders, 
contradicting the notion of a borderless world. The report 
emphasises, furthermore, that this phenomenon cannot be 
explained only by transportation costs. Another barrier to 
trade has to exist. The report outlines different possible 
explanations of this phenomenon, but focuses strongly on 
the significance of trust in transactions. It concludes that 
there is a range of explanations working together to 
explain why there is less trade over longer distances. 
However, the reduced possibility of finding trusting 
relations at distant locations is presented as a strong 
argument and a possible solution to the ´mystery of the 
missing trade`. 
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